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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STA TE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent;

Docket No. 39646-2012
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

v.

CHARLES EARL GUESS;
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District for Latah County, the
Honorable John R. Stegner presiding.
Roderick C. Bond of Roderick Bond Law Office, PLLC, 800 Bellevue Way NE, Suite
400, Bellevue, WA 98004, for the Defendant-Appellant Charles Earl Guess.
The Honorable Lawrence O. Wasden, Attorney General for the State ofIdaho, and Lori
A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General for the State ofIdaho, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 837200010, for the Plaintiff-Respondent State of Idaho.
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
Charles Earl Guess ("Charles") is a 73-year-old man who, pursuant to the terms of a Rule
11 Plea Agreement, pled guilty to Aggravated Assault in exchange for a withheld judgment.
(App., A-B.) At the hearing held to accept the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, Judge Stegner
questioned Charles about his understanding of that Agreement: "1 am pleading guilty to this
charge .. .if I fulfill the period of probation without any problems in that period of time ... the
felony charges ... would be dropped." (App., C, p. 77, L. 16,20-23.) Judge Stegner agreed that
Charles' understanding was correct: "Well, Mr. Guess ... I think you understand what a withheld
judgment means." (App., C, p. 78, L. 8-9.). After Charles completed his sentence and probation,
he moved to have his guilty plea set aside. The district court found: "1 have a defendant who has
performed as well as any defendant I can remember while on probation," but denied the Motion.
(App., C, p. 56, L. 20-21 & D.) Consequently, Charles moved to enforce the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement by asserting, inter alias, that "[a]llowing the government to breach a promise that
induced a guilty plea violates due process" (Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir.
1994) and it must be enforced "[fJocusing on the defendant's reasonable understanding." State

v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595-96, 226 P.3d 535, 538 (2010) ("[W]hen a plea rests ... on a
promise ... so that it can be said to be part of the consideration, such promise must be fulfilled")
(citations omitted). Despite Charles' clear reasonable understanding of the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement, the district court denied the Motion. (App., E.) The Court should reverse and remand
with instructions to set aside his guilty plea, dismiss this action and restore all of his civil rights.

1

B.

Statement of Facts and Procedural History.

The following Statement of Facts and Procedural History ("Facts") and all citations to the
record and the transcript are incorporated by reference into all of the arguments in Section IV.
Charles is 73-years-old and has resided in Moscow, Idaho for over thirty-seven years. (R.
Vol. T, p. 17, Vol. IT, p. 245,

~3.)

On April 26, 2006, Charles was charged with two counts of

Aggravated Assault and one count of Domestic Violence Battery involving his ex-wife, Michele
Guess ("Michele") and her attorney. (R. Vol. I, p. 16-17, Vol. II, p. 245,

~3;

Tr., p. 112.) Other

than traffic infractions, Charles had never been arrested, charged with any criminal offense or
accused of domestic violence. (R. Vol. IT, p. 245,

~3.)

On June 16, 2006, the Complaint was

amended based upon a Rule 11 Plea Agreement wherein Charles agreed to plead guilty to
Aggravated Assault in exchange for a withheld judgment, probation not to exceed five years and
other agreed terms. (App., A; R. Vol. I, p. 49-50.) Charles testified as to his understanding:
Based upon my understanding that I would receive a withheld judgment and that
my guilty plea would be set aside in no more than five years if I complied with all
the terms of my sentence and probation under the tenns of the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement (and that no trace of this action would be on my record), I agreed to
wave my right to a jury trial and pled guilty to one of the three charges.
I cherish my civil rights. Having my civil rights is extremely important to me and
this is one of the material reasons why I agreed to be bound by the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement. I wanted to be able to once again enjoy all my civil liberties. I I
understood my obligations under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and pledged to
comply with those obligations. In return, I had the expectation that if I complied
with my obligations that I would be permitted to withdraw my guilty plea, have
this case dismissed and have my cherished civil rights restored.
(R. Vol. II, p. 245-46,

~~4

& 6.) The district court confinned Charles' reasonable understanding:

1 Charles is an avid ouldoorsman and hunter. Thus, his right to possess fireanns for hunting was one of tile
inducements for him to plead guilly through the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (R. Vol. II, p. 19-i, 2-i5--i6, ';~-i & 6.)
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(The Court):

And my understanding is that you're pleading pursuant to a Rule 11
Agreement; is that correct?

(The Defendant):

Yes.

(The Court):

Why don't you explain to me what your understanding is of what
will happen to you ifI accept that plea.

(The Defendant): Well, my understanding is there will be a presentencing
investigation and then a sentencing hearing.
(The Court):

And do you understand that the agreement contemplates that you
would receive a withheld judgment as a result of pleading f,ruilty to
this charge?

(The Defendant): Yes, sir.
(The Court):

Do you know what a "withheld judgment" means?

(The Defendant):

Yes.

(The Court):

Why don't you explain to me what you're understanding is?

(The Defendant): Well, I mean that - I guess, I'd explain that - my understanding of
the entire agreement is that I that I am pleading guilty to this
charge and that I will spend my punishment will include 30 days
in Latah County jail. I will pay a $\,000 fine. And I'm pleading
guilty to one of the - one of the felony charges. I'll have a year
probation, and if I fulfill the period of probation without any
problems in that period of time, that the felony charges would -would be dropped.
(The Court):

Well, Mr. Guess, the -- I think you understand what a withheld
judgment means. It means that if you comply with your terms and
conditions of probation that at the conclusion of the period of
probation, which is for a period of no more than five years,
according to the agreement, that you could come in and petition to
have your guilty plea, which you tendered today, withdrawn and
the charge against you dismissed. Do you understand that?

(The Defendant): I do, yes.
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(App., C, p. 76, L. 21-25, p. 77, L. 1-23 & p. 78, L. 8-16.) Neither the district court nor the State
rejected or disputed Charles' reasonable understanding. (App., C. 76-78; Tr., p. 63-88.) The
district court explained some of the reasons why it accepted the Rule 11 Plea Agreement:
One of the reasons that I was willing to accept the Rule 11 Agreement, Mr. Guess,
frankly, is the - as your counselor put it, the numerous charitable acts that you
have perfonned. It's rare when I see someone who has done as much as you have,
and for that, you, I think, are getting the benefit of your agreement with the
State ... I was genuinely impressed by the contributions that you have made to
society both personally and professionally that is evidenced in the letters that were
submitted on your behalf. ..
I also thought that your statement was genuine and heartfelt. I'd also - I think
recognizes that he is not trying to blame others for what you do. It's important
that you exhibit that empathy for your victims of this incident. I think you, by
your statement, you figured that out.
(App., C, p. 120. L. 20-25, p. 121, L. 1, 6-9, 12-15 & p. 122, L. 12-16.) After reviewing the
presentence report, the district court accepted the Rule 11 Plea Agreement,

~with()llt

qual[flcation:

Then pursuant to the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, I am withholding judgment in this
case. I am placing Mr. Guess on a period of five years [of] probation under my
standard terms and conditions ...
(App., C, p. 85, L. 10-13, p. 109, L. 6-7 & p. 119, L. 9-12.)
On September 6, 2006, the district court entered the Order Withholding Entry of
Judgment and Order of Probation ("Order Withholding Judgment"). (App., B, p. 1-8.) Pursuant
to the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, the district court found: "that the interests of justice would be
best served if entry of judgment were withheld and the defendant placed on probation," imposed
sentenced Charles to thirty days of incarceration, imposed other terms of sentence and ordered
the maximum five-years of probation (the State requested the maximum based upon Michele's
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fear). (App., A-B & C, p. 115, L. 8-17.) For the next five years, Charles faithfully and diligently
complied with all terms of his sentence and probation, without any problems or violations:
As of September 1,2011 and through the date that my probation was tem1inated, I
faithfully and without violation served my sentence and completed my 5 years of
probation in accordance with the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Order Withholding
Entry of Judgment and Order of Probation I was also never found to be in
violation of my probation, despite several unannounced visits by the probation
officers to my residence. I was under the constant threat that if I violated the terms
of my probation in any way, then I would be in violation of the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement and I could be subject to significant jail time. I served my 30 days in
jail. I promptly paid all court costs, fines, and other mandated costs, sometimes
two months in advance of the due date. Because of my compliance, over time I
was given certain additional liberties to travel and was eventually placed on
unsupervised probation.
(R. Vol. II, p. 247-48,

~9;

see also id, p. 248-49,

~~1O-11.)

Charles was transferred to

unsupervised probation on January 27,2011. (Id; R. Vol. II, p. 171-72.) On August 31,2011, the
tive-year term of probation and No Contact Order expired. (R. Vol. J, p. 69, 103-11.) Prior to and
after its expiration, Michele never requested a modification or extension of that No Contact
Order. On September 7,2011, Charles tiled a Motion to Dismiss Withheld Judgment. CR. Vol. II,
p. 174-75.) Charles testified that he had complied with all terms of probation. (R. Vol. II, p. 176-

177.) Fourteen letters were submitted in support of Charles (R. Vol. II, p. 179-209.), including
one letter from his Psychologist, who, without compensation, voluntarily stated:
At no time in our counseling sessions has [Charles] ever expressed wanting to
harm his ex-wife in any way. Overall, he has left me with the impression that he
has no desire to have any additional contact with her, except in the context of coparenting their son. I do not believe that he currently poses a threat to her, or to
himself at this time.
(R. Vol. II, p. 183 & 252,

~19.)

The State did not file a Response and no evidence was submitted
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opposing Charles' Motion. On November 16, 2011, a hearing was held and the district court
orally denied the Motion 2 (Tr. p. 46, L. 13, p. 57, L. 6-7.) At that hearing, the district court
found: "I have a defendant who has performed as well as anv defendant 1 can remember
while on probation." (App., C, p. 56, L. 20-21 (emphasis added).) On December 23,2011, the
Court denied Charles' Motion, but it ruled that he had "successfully completed the period of
probation ordered by the Court" and discharged him from probation 3 (R. Vol. II, p. 212-13.)
On January 19, 2012, Charles asserted, inter alia.'}', the refusal to set aside his guilty plea,
dismiss this action and restore his civil rights constitutes separate breaches of his Rule 11 Plea
Agreement. (R. Vol. IT, p. 218-43.) In Response to that Motion, despite Charles' clear

reasonable understanding of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement (App., C, p. 76-78; R. Vo!' II, p. 245-

46,

~~4-8),

the State asserted:

The plea agreement in this case, as with vil1ually all other similar agreements,
does not contain specific language about the withdrawal of the guilty plea and
ultimate dismissal of the case ... While it is true that the undersigned cannot recall
any other case where a defendant complied with his probation and did not receive
Idaho Code 19-3604 [sic] relief. .. the State's intent at the time of the plea was that
by virtue of the Court withholding judgment, Idaho Code 19-2604 relief would be
available to Dr. Guess (and, practically, speaking, the State would expect that the
Court would grant the relief) if Dr. Guess was fully compliant with his probation."
(R. Vol. II, p. 261-62.) The State never objected or rejected Charles' reasonable understanding
of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (App., C, p. 76-78; R. Vol. II, p. 245-47,

~~4-8

& p. 260-62A.)

2 Only Michele appeared telephonically at the hearing and she resides in another state. (See Presentence
Report.) Contrary to the district COUlt's finding, she did not object to the relief requested or the Motion, but stated "1
still have some fear. . .1, as a victim, will always be in fear of Mr. Guess." (App., C, p. 55, L. 17-18, 22-23.)
3 Charles \vas on probation for 114 days longer in violation of Idaho law. See Section IY(D).
4 The State's Response was signed by William W. Thompson, Jr., and he presented oral argument at the
two recent hearings. (R. Vol. II, p. 260-264, Tr., p. 6 & 47.) The State was represented by James E. M. Craig for the
execution and entry of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (App., A-B: Tr., p. 61 & 102.)
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At the hearing, Judge Stegner found: "I don't think that I've ever seen a showing as positive

as I saw for Mr. Guess." (App., C, p. 42, L. 9-1 a (emphasis added).) But the district court
denied Charles relief under I.C § 19-2604(1) based upon Michele's fear, although she never
objected and failed to present any evidence to support any new allegations of fear 5 (Tr., p. 8-43;
App., C, p. 55, L. 11-24.) Charles and Michele's adult son confirmed that she did not object:
In my communications with my mother she has had no objection to full
reinstatement of his civil liberties.
(R. Vol. IT, p. 181.) However, the district court orally denied Charles' Motion and refused to
state how or when Charles would ever obtain relief (App., C, p. 38, L. 16-17; R. Vol. IT, p. 242.)
I think that there will come a time when Mr. Guess's rights will be restored. I
can't tell you when that time will be, but I think given the showing that I have
seen, given the contrition that I have seen, given the rehabilitation that I have
seen, I think Mr. Guess is on the right track as far as having me grant the relief
that he requests.
(App., C, p. 38, L. 18-24.) But Michele's alleged fear was the sole reason for denying relief:
(Mr. Bond):

... so that T know Tunderstood you right, did you say earlier that if
Michele didn't object, then you would grant the relief:>

(The Court):

I did ... Whether that is possible is anybody's guess.

(Mr. Bond):

So, that's what you're really hinging the -- the compatible with
public interest is, whether if Michele is -- your concern over
Michele?

(The Court):

That's my current reservation.

(Mr. Bond):

Okay. Okay. And -- and just so that Charles knows, is there -- is

5 Michele was only one of the two victims. TIle State indicated that the other victim had no interest in the
proceedings: "Mr. Welsh. some time back, advised us when we contacted him that he didn't have any position about
how - this case ,Yent at any stage. He didn't need to be involved any more." (Tr.• p. 33, L 23-25, p. 34, L 1.)
Additionally, the district court stated: "I don't think he has [an] objection." (Ii/. at L 19.)
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there anything else that he needs to be doing to somehow help the
process along or just continue to be a law abiding citizen?
(The Court):

Continue to be a law abiding citizen. Continue to do the things that
he's done in the time that he's been on probation. As I said, I don't
think I've ever seen a showing as positive as I saw for Mr. Guess.
And my hesitancy is based upon the compatibility with the public
interest, and Michele Guess as a victim of the offense, can-ies no
small amount of voice in that.

(App., C, p. 41, L. 15-18,20-21,24-25, p. 42, L. 1-13.) Later that day, Charles filed his Notice of
Appeal. (R Vol. II, p. 273-77.) On February 6, 2012, the district court explained its ruling:
The fact that one of the victims in this case still fears the party who is seeking the
extraordinary relief granted by 1. C. § 19-2604(1) is no small issue for this Court.
This Court acknowledges that Guess is on the right track to obtaining the relief he
seeks, which is why this Court indicated that it would be willing to revisit this
issue in the future. The determination that Guess should be granted relief under
I.C. § 19-2604(1) is not entirely dependent on Michele's acquiescence. Such
acquiescence may never occur. Nonetheless, this Court is unwilling to
disregard her feal' of the Defendant and her objection to him being granted
relief pursuant to I. C. § 19-2604(1), at this time. Because this Court finds that it
would not be compatible with the public interest to set aside Guess's plea of
guilty, dismiss his case, and restore his civil rights, it declines to do so.
(App., E, p. 6-7.) On March 12,2012, Charles appealed that order as well. (Mot. Aug. R, p. 1-5.)

C. Identification of Appendixes.
Charles has attached Appendixes A-E to this Brief. Appendix A ("App., A") is the Rule
11 Plea Agreement. (R Vol. I, p. 52-54.) Appendix B ("App., B") is the Order Withholding
Entry of Judgment. (R Vol. I, p. 103-110.) Appendix C ("App., C") are pertinent pages of the
Transcript. (Tr., p. 1-127.) Appendix D ("App., D") is the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Withheld Judgment. (R Vol. II, p. 212-213.) Appendix E ("App., E") is the "Order
Denying Defendant's Motion to Enforce Rule 11 Plea Agreement. .. " (R Vol. II, p. 280-286.)
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Whether the district court erred by: (1) not interpreting and enforcing the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement in accordance with its plain meaning and (2) by not construing the Rule II
Plea Agreement against the State and in Charles' favor in accordance with his reasonable
understanding requiring the State bear the responsibility for any lack of clarity?

B. Whether Charles' constitutional due process rights were violated when the promise that
induced him to plead guilty pursuant to the Rule 11 Plea Agreement was not honored?
C. Whether the district court erred in finding the "compatible with the public interest"
provision in I.e. § 19-2604(1) was not satisfied based upon Michele's alleged "fear" and
whether that finding was barred from being re-litigated and was it supported by
substantial and competent evidence?

D. Whether the district court had jurisdiction to not dismiss the Order Withholding
Judgment once Charles complied with the terms and conditions of sentence and probation
and whether the di strict court's orders further constitute an illegal sentence?
E.

Whether the district court erred by not holding that the Rule 11 Plea Agreement prevailed
over I.e. § 19-2601(3) and I.e. § 19-2604(1)?

F.

Whether the district court erred by not restoring Charles' civil rights (including the right
to bear arms) in violation of I.e. § 19-2604(1), the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, federal law
and his constitutional rights and whether that issue is barred from being re-litigated?
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the consideration, such promise
must be fulfilled. Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of
law to be viewed by this Court de novo, in accordance with contract law
standards. In detennining whether the State has breached a plea agreement a court
must examine the language of the plea agreement, and where the language of that
plea agreement is ambiguous, those ambiguities shall be resolved in favor of the
defendant. The burden of proving the existence of a contract and the fact of its
breach is upon the plaintiff. The determination that a plea agreement is ambiguous
is a question of law; however, interpretation of an ambiguous tem1 is a question of
fact.

Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596 (citations omitted).
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Where a defendant claims that his or her right to due process was violated, we
defer to the trial court's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence.
However, [the Court] freely review[s] the application of constitutional principles
to those facts found. It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate facts that
constitute a due process violation. It is fundamental to our legal system that the
State shall not deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." It is a two-step process to determine due process rights: first,
deciding whether a governmental decision would deprive an individual of a
libeliy or property interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause; and second, if a liberty or propelty interest is implicated, a
balancing test must be applied to deternline what process is due. "[M]inimum
procedural due process requirements ultimately tum on a highly fact specific
inquiry." The reviewing courts analyze the totality of the circumstances.

State v. Jacobson, 150 Idaho 131, 134-35, 244 P.3d 630, 633-34 (Ct. App. 2010) (citations
omitted).

I.e.

§ 19-2604(1) authorizes a court to set aside a guilty plea if the defendant complies

with terms of probation. 5'tate v. Gr{tfith, 140 Idaho 616, 617, 97 P.3d 483, 484 (Ct. App. 2004).
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes.
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give
effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. The
language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. If
the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort
to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. When this Court must
engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent
and give effect to that intent. To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only
must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those
words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. It is
incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it
a nullity. Constructions of statutes that would lead to an absurd result are
disfavored.

State v. Dicksen, 152 Idaho 70, 266 P.3d 1175, 1178-79 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted).
"Statutes ... relating to the same subject, should be construed harmoniously, if possible to further
the legislative intent." State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827, 828, 230 P.3d 437, 438 (2010) (citations
omitted). A specific statute governs or controls over a general statute. Ausman v. State, 124
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Idaho 839, 842, 864 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Ct. App. 1993). Criminal statutes must be construed in
favor of the defendant. State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 437, 614 P.2d 970, 977 (1980).
Findings of fact will be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial and competent
evidence, which is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592-93, 977 P.2d 203, 206-07 (1999). A district
court has discretion under I.e. § 19-2604(1) to set aside a defendant's guilty plea and restore his
civil rights. State v. Hanes, 137 Idaho 40, 41, 44 P.3d 295, 296 (Ct. App. 2002)("Hanes r).
Issues pertaining to illegal sentences and jurisdiction are questions of law over which this Court
exercises free review. State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837,839,252 P.3d 1255,1257 (2011).
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (I) whether the lower court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

Hanes I, 137 Idaho at 41 (citation omitted).
IV.

ARGUMENTS

The district court erred by not addressing the issues in Sections (A)(2), (B), (C)(2), (D)(F). (App., D-E, Tr., p. 36-43 & 49-57.) Moreover, the district court incorrectly perceived the

issue in Sections (A)-(B) & (C)(l) as ones of discretion, failed to act within the boundaries of the
discretion exercised for those issues and failed to exercise reason for those issues by basing its
decisions on Michele's alleged "feae" (ld; Section III.) Finally, the district court erred by not
interpreting I.e. §§ 19-2604(1) and 19-2601(3): in favor of Charles, hannoniously in accordance
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with their plain meaning and the legislature's intent, to ensure that the interpretation did not
render them a nullity, and to ensure the interpretation of them was not an absurd result. (App., DE, Tr., p. 36-43 & 49-57; Section III.) For anyone or more of the following reasons, the district
court erred when it refused to grant Charles relief and the COUli should reverse and remand with
instructions to set aside his guilty plea, dismiss this action and restore all of his civil rights:

A. The district court erred in its interpretation of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement.
"A court, as well as the prosecution and defendant, is bound by the agreement once the

plea agreement is accepted without qualification." State v. Horkley, 125 Idaho 860, 865, 876
P.2d 142, 147 (1994); Costilow v. State, 318 S.W.3d 534, 537 (Tex. Ct. App. 20 10)("The role of
the trial judge is to follow or reject the agreement ... "); Clark v. State, 468 S.E.2d 653, 655 (S.c.
1996) ("Once a court accepts a plea agreement, it is bound to honor its promise to perform the
agreement ... ");

u.s.

v. Ritsema, 89 F.3d 392, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[0]nce the court signed

off on the agreement. .. it became bound by the terms of the agreement"); Us. v. Fernandez, 960
F.2d 771, 773 (9th Cir. 1991) ("the trial court may accept or reject the agreement"); I.c.R. 11 (f)
"One possible remedy for the breach of a plea agreement is specific perfomlance of the
terms of that agreement." HOI'kley, 125 Idaho at 865. See also

u.s. v. Yellow, 627 F.3d 706, 709

(8th Cir. 2010) ("to breach a promise that induced a guilty plea violates due process and
undermines the honor of the government, public confidence in the fair administration of justice")
(citations omitted); Ritsema, 89 F.3d at 402 ("We believe the plea agreement must be
honored ... "); Margalli-OIvera, 43 F.3d at 351 ("Allowing the govemment to breach a promise
that induced a guilty plea violates due process."). "To assess whether a plea agreement has been
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violated, this court considers whether the government's conduct is consistent with the
defendant's reasonable understanding."

u.s.

v. Roberts, 624 F.3d 241, 245-46 (5th Cir. 2010).

"[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so
that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S. Ct. 495,499 (1971). Tn Ritsema, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained the public policy behind honoring plea bargains:
[O]nce they have given unqualified approval to the plea agreement, they, like the
parties, become bound by the terms of that agreement. Were courts free to reexamine the wisdom of plea bargains with the benefit of hindsight, the
agreements themselves would lack finality and the benefits that encourage the
government and defendants to enter into pleas might prove illusory ... Once the
court signed off on the agreement at Ritsema's first sentencing in 1993, it became
bound by the terms of the agreement ...
Pleas that bind only the defendant, or even the prosecutor and the
defendant but not the judge, would be unfair to the defendant and
would dilute the incentive for defendants to plead at all ...

Ritsema, 89 F.3d at 401-02 (citation and quotations omitted).
Here, the district court correctly found that the Rule II Plea Agreement was a valid and
enforceable contract 6 (App., E, p. 3-5.) The district court accepted the Rule 11 Plea Agreement

without qual!/ication. (App., A-B & C, p. 119, L. 9-12.) However, the district court erred by: (1)
incorrectly interpreting the plain meaning of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement; and/or (2) by finding
the Rule 11 Plea Agreement unambiguous and failing to construe the Rule 11 Plea Agreement in
favor of Charles based upon his reasonable ullderstanding and requiring the State to bear the
responsibility for any lack of clarity. (App., E, p. 3-5.) In sum, Charles has not received the
"I.R.C. II was amended in 2007. Although the Rule II Plea Agreement references "I.C.R. II(d)(l)(C),"
subsection "(d)" is now subsection "(1)". However, the relevant language remains unchanged. (App., A, p. I.)
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benefit of the State's promise that induced him to plead guilty. (App., C, p. 76-78.)
Had I known before I executed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement that after 1 completed
the terms and conditions required under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Order
Withholding Judgment that I would not have the right to set aside my guilty plea,
have this action dismissed and have my civil rights restored, I would never had
executed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement or pled guilty to any of the charges against
me. I would have proceeded to trial.
(R. Vol. II, p. 249,

~12;

App., C, p. 76-78.) Simply put, there are no written terms in the Rule 11

Plea Agreement that support the district court or State's interpretations. (App., A-B, D & E, p. 35; R. Vol. II, p. 260-62A.) Thus, based upon any of the reasons in Sections A(1)-(2) below, the
district court and State have breached the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and it should be specifically
enforced to set aside Charles' guilty plea, dismiss this action and restore all of his civil rights7
1. The district court erred by not enforcing the Rule 11 Plea Agreement in

accordance with its plain meaning.
"The meaning of an unambiguous contract must be determined from the plain meaning
of the contract's own words." State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886,11 P.3d 1101,1104 (2000). A
court may "[w]ithhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe and may
place the defendant on probation."

I.e.

§ 19-2601(3). See

I.e.

§ 19-2604(1). "To withhold

judgment after a plea of guilty protects the defendant at that time against the stigma of a
conviction which may be forever avoided should the defendant conform to its terms and
conditions" E" parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 479, 253 P2d 794, 797 (1953). As set forth in
Section TTl above, statutes must be interpreted in favor of the defendant, in accordance with

7 Although revocation of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and allowing Charles to withdraw his guilty plea and
proceed to trial are also remedies, they are not appropriate remedies here because he has already complied with fiveyear period of probation and other tenns o[sentence. (R. Vol. II, p. 247-49, ~~9-11; App .. D. p. 2 &E. p. 6.)
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legislative intent and in a manner that prevents absurd results.
The obvious and commendable objective of the Act which seeks in a proper case
to avoid the stigma of a judgment of conviction would be in major part defeated if
the contention of petitioner is accepted. To withhold judgment after a plea of
guilty protects the defendant at that time against the stigma of a conviction which
may be forever avoided should the defendant conform to its terms and conditions.
This creates, and rightfully so, a hope in the heart of the accused that he may
ultimately be released under an order of probation without the stigma of a
judgment of conviction. This is an incentive for complete rehabilitation and
reform, one of the salutary objectives of the Act.

Medley, 73 Idaho at 479. See State v. Hanes, 139 Idaho 392, 394, 79 P.3d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App.
2003) ("Hailes IF') ("we presume that the legislature intended that in order for a defendant to be
granted relief under I.e. § 19-2604( I), he or she must comply with ... probation ... ").
Here, the district court erred in its interpretation of the plain meaning of the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement. (App., E, p. 3-5.) The district court's decision was an abuse of discretion because it
may only "[w]ithhold judgment on such tenns and for such time as it may prescribe and may
place the defendant on probation." I.e. § 19-2601(3). The Rule 11 Plea Agreement provided:
That the Defendant shall receive a Withheld Judgment and shall be placed on
probation to the Idaho State Department of corrections for a peIiod of no more
than five (5) years ...
(App., A, p. 2.) As a result, the Order Withholding Judgment was entered, which provided:
[O]n June 19, 2006, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to such charge which
plea was accepted by the Court ... the Court finds that the interests of justice would
be best served if the entry of judgment were withheld and the defendant placed on
probation to the Idaho State Board of Correction ... FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE
(5) YEARS COMMENCING ON AUGUST 31,2006 ...
(App., B, p. 2.) There is not a single term in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement reserving any rights or
discretion to the district court to extend probation or indefinitely withhold judgment past five
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years, so long as Charles complies with probation. (App., A-B.) When questioned by the district
court at the hearing held to accept the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, Charles confinned, without
objection by any party, the plain meaning: "I'll have a period of probation, and if I fulfill the
period of probation without any problems in that period of time, that the felony charges
would -- would be dropped." (App., C, p. 77, L. 20-23.) (emphasis added). Judge Stegner
agreed with this plain meaning: "I think vou understand what a withheld judgment means."
(App., C, p. 78, L. 8-9 (emphasis added).). After Charles completed all of the terms of his
sentence and five-years of probation, the district court found: "I don't think I've ever seen a
showing as positive as I saw for Mr. Guess." (App., C, p. 42, L. 9-10.) Thus, not only did
Charles live up to his end of the bargain under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, but he did so better
than any defendant the district court had seen. When the district court found Charles
"successfully completed the period of probation" and "fully complied with every court-imposed
term and condition of his probation" (App., D, p. 2 & E, p. 285), it was required to set aside his
guilty plea under the plain meaning of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, but it did not and the Rule 11
Plea Agreement has been breached. Significantly, the State has done nothing to cure that breach.
When the State's Attorney has given his word in the form of a plea bargain ... it
behooves the State's Attorney to make every reasonable effort to correct any
deviation from the bargain when the deviation is called to his attention.

Clark, 468 S.E.2d at 655. Instead, the State simply asserted it "would expect that the Court
would grant the relief" (R. Vol. IT, p. 262.) The Rule II Agreement remains in breach.
Moreover, the district court and State's positions are contrary to the legislature's intent for
authorizing withheld judgments. (App., E, p. 5; R. VoLlI, p. 261) See

16

I.e. §§ 19-2601(3) and 19-

2604(1); Hanes II, 139 Idaho at 394; 114edley, 73 Idaho at 479. These authorities implicitly hold

that a court has no discretion to deny a request to set aside a guilty plea upon the defendant's
compliance with the terms of probation and sentence under a withheld judgment-which is the
legislature's intent to refonn defendants through I.e. §§ 19-2601(3) and 19-2604(1). If a district
court may deny a defendant's request for a withheld judgment if it "has sufficient information to
determine that a withheld judgment would be inappropriate" (S'fa!e v. Geier, 109 Idaho 963, 965,
712 P.2d 664,666 (1985», then the district court abused its discretion when it did not set aside
Charles' guilty plea after he complied with all terms of sentence and probationS (App., D-E.)
2. The district court erred by not enforcing the Rule 11 Plea Agreement in Charles'
favor in accordance with his reasonable understanding and by not requiring the
State to bear the responsibility for the lack of clarity.
Any

ambiguities in a plea agreement must be interpreted

111

favor of the

defendant. Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596; US. v. Jensen, 423 F.3d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 2005) (if "a
plea agreement is ambiguous, the ambiguities are construed against the government.").
Ambiguities in a plea agreement are to be interpreted in favor of the defendant.
"As with other contracts, provisions of plea agreements are occasionally
ambiguous; the government 'ordinarily must bear the responsibility for any lack
of clarity." "[AJmbiguities are construed in favor of the defendant. Focusing on
the defendant'S reasonable understandi11g also reflects the proper constitutional
focus on what induced the defendant to plead guilty."
Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Fernandez, 960 F.2d at 772

("To determine ... the tenns of the plea agreement, we look to what was reasol1ably understood
by the defendant when he entered his plea.") (emphasis added); Roberts, 624 F.3d at 245-46 ("To

R As discussed in SectionIV(D), the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to indefinitely suspend
the Order Withholding Judgment after Charles complied with the tenns and conditions of sentence and probation.
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assess whether a plea agreement has been violated, this court considers ... the defendant's

reasonable understanding.") (emphasis added).
Here, the district court erred when it found the Rule 11 Plea Agreement unambiguous and
failed to interpret it in favor of Charles in accordance with his reasonable understanding and by
not requiring the State to bear the responsibility for any lack of clarity. (App., E, p. 3-5.)
First, the district cOUli and State both implicitly concede that the Rule 11 Plea Agreement
was ambiguous based upon the indefiniteness of when his guilty plea would set aside:
The plea agreement in this case, as with virtually all other similar agreements,
does not contain specific language about withdrawal of the guilty plea and
ultimate dismissal of the case. Rather, it uses my office's standard language which
agrees to the Court withholding judgment, but which does not specify what means
prospectively as far as Idaho Code 19-3604 [sic] relief.
(R. Vol. II, p. 261.) The district court asserted: "[t]he agreement does not contain a single term
regarding the ultimate disposition of this case." (App., E, p. 5.) "[T]he burden is upon the party
claiming that ambiguity exists to show the necessary indefinite of meaning." 11 Williston on
Contracts § 30:5 (4th ed.) By the State and district court's own admissions, Charles has met that
burden. Thus, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement is ambiguous because it is vague and indefinite as to
when Charles' guilty plea would be set aside. As such, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement must be
construed in Charles' favor and it is "implied by the plea agreement" that his guilty plea would
be set aside upon completing probation. (App., A; R. Vol. II, p. 262.) 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law § 640 (2012) (courts "will not constme the language so literally that the purpose of the plea
agreement is frustrated; accordingly, the court considers terms implied by the plea agreement").
Second, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement must be enforced in accordance with Charles'
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reasonable understanding. Petersoll, 148 Idaho at 595-97. Charles' reasonable understanding of
the Rule 11 Plea Agreement has never been disputed by the State or the district court:
I was aware that I had the option of having my case decided by [a] jury, but I
wished to accept responsibility for my actions, pay the price and then be rewarded
for doing so. I carefully reviewed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement prior to signing it.
lt was explained to me by my attorney and I understood that ifI complied with all
of the terms and conditions in that Rule 11 Plea Agreement (including up to five
years of probation), then I would be permitted to have my guilty plea set aside,
this action dismissed and my civil rights restored and there would be nothing on
my previously unblemished record. Based upon my understanding that I would
receive a withheld judgment and that my guilty plea would be set aside in no
more than five years ifI complied with all the terms of my sentence and probation
under the terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement (and that no trace of this action
would be on my record), I agreed to wave my right to a jury trial and pled guilty
to one of the three charges.
I cherish my civil rights. Having my civil rights is extremely important to me and
this is one of the material reasons why I agreed to be bound by the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement. I wanted to be able to once again enjoy all my civil liberties. 1
understood my obligations under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and pledged to
comply with those obligations. In return, I had the expectation that if I complied
with my obligations that I would be pennitted to withdraw my guilty plea, have
this case dismissed and have my cherished civil rights restored.
(R. Vo!' II, p. 245-46,

~~4

& 6.) The district court even questioned his understanding:

(The Court):

And my understanding is that you're pleading pursuant to a Rule 11
Agreement; is that correct?

(The Defendant):

Yes.

(The Court):

'Vhy don't you explain to me what your understanding is of
what will happen to you if I accept that plea.

(The Defendant):

Well, my understanding is there will be a pre sentencing
investigation and then a sentencing hearing.

(The Court):

And do you understand that the agreement contemplates that
vou would receive a withheld judgment as a result of pleading
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guilty to this charge?
(The Defendant): Yes. sir.
(The Court):

Do you know what a "withheld judgment" means?

(The Defendant): Yes.
(The Court):

Why don't you explain to me what you're understanding is?

(The Defendant): Well, I mean that I guess, I'd explain that - my understanding
of the entire agreement is that I - that I am pleading guilty to
this charge and that 1 will spend my punishment will include 30
days in Latah County jail. I will pay a $1,000 fine. And I'm
pleading guilty to one of the - one of the felony charges. I'll
have a year probation, and if I fulfill the period of probation
without any problems in that period of time, that the felony
chal'ges would -- would be dropped.
(The Court):

Well, Mr. Guess, the -- I think you understand what a withheld
judgment means. It means that if vou comply with your terms
and conditions of probation that at the conclusion of the period
of probation, which is for a period of no more than five years,
according to the agreement, that vou could come in and petition
to have your guilty plea, which you tendered today, withdrawn
and the charge against you dismissed. Do you understand that?

(The Defendant): I do, yes.
(App., C, p. 76, L. 21-25, p. 77, L. 1-23 & p. 78, L. 8-16 (emphasis added).) When Charles
articulated his reasonable understanding, the district court and State had a duty to advise Charles
of the positions which they are now taking, but they both failed to do so. (Tr., p. 76-88.)
Peterson, 148 Idaho at 597. Instead, the district court agreed with his understanding and the

State accepted his understanding through its silence. Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596-97 (citing
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69 (1981 ». Since the State did not object or reject Charles'
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reasonable understanding (Tr., 76-88), it became a part of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. ld. In
reality, Charles' undisputed reasonable understanding was also the State's understanding:
" ... the State would expect that the Court would grant the relief." (R. Vol. II, p. 262.) In sum,
Charles was induced to plead guilty by a false promise. See Section IV(B). If this Court accepts
the State and district court's positions as to the ultimate disposition, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement
would lack finality and be illusory. Ritsema, 89 F .3d at 401 ("the agreements ... would lack
finality and ... prove illusory"). Notably, the State could not "recall any other case where a
defendant has complied with his probation and did not receive Idaho Code 19-2604 relief." (R.
Vol. II, p. 261.) Tfthe district court or State wanted the right to take their present positions, then
it was incumbent upon the State to include those terms in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement or the
district court to reject it, but they both failed to do so. See 1.c.R. 11(f). Thus, Charles' undisputed

reasonable understanding of the terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement is controlling and it
should be enforced in accordance with his reasonable understanding-which is that his guilty
plea must be set aside and his civil rights restored now that he has complied with all terms of
sentence and probation. Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596 ("Focusing on the defendant's reasonable

understanding also reflects the proper constitutional focus on what induced the defendant to
plead guilty."); Roberts, 624 F.3d at 245-46 ("To assess whether a plea agreement has been
violated, this court considers ... the defendant's reasollable understanding."); Santobel1o, 404
U.S. at 262 ("[W]hen a plea rests ... on a promise ... such promise must be fulfilled.").
Third, the State must bear the responsibility for any lack of clarity in the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement. Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596-97. Since the distlict court and State both assert that the
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Rule 11 Plea Agreement does not specifically state when Charles' guilty plea would be set aside
(R Vol. II, p. 261-62; App., E, p. 5), the State must bear the responsibility for that lack of clarity.
There are no terms or conditions in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement which expressly state, let alone
infer, that the district court would retain any discretion for the ultimate disposition of Charles'
case, so long as he complied with the terms of sentence and probation. (App., A.) It is illogical to
believe that Charles, let alone any defendant, would agree to plead guilty to a withheld judgment
that could be suspended indefinitely-during which time he would be considered a convicted
felon. See Us. v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403, 179 P.3d 1059 (2008). In fact, I.C. § 19-2604 is not even
referenced in the Rule Plea Agreement or the Order Withholding Judgment-let alone Michele's
fear. (App., A-B.) However, the district court based its decision solely on Michele's alleged fear:
The fact that one of the victims in this case still fears the party who is seeking the
extraordinary relief granted by T. e. § 19-2604(1) is no small issue for this Court.
This Court acknowledges that Guess is on the right track to obtaining the relief he
seeks, which is why this Court indicated that it would be willing to revisit this
issue in the future. The determination that Guess should be granted relief under
I.e. § 19-2604(1) is not entirely dependent on Michele's acquiescence. Such
acquiescence may never occur. Nonetheless, this Court is unwilling to disregard
her fear of the Defendant and her objection to him being granted relief pursuant to
I. e. § 19-2604(1), at this time. Because this Court finds that it would not be
compatible with the public interest to set aside Guess's plea of guilty, dismiss his
case, and restore his civil rights, it declines to do so.
(App., D & E, p. 6-7.) Notably, if the district court believed Michele's fear was a basis to deny
the "extraordinary relief' to Charles, the proper mechanism was to reject the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement-rather than induce him to plead guilty with a false promise. If the State wanted
language that the district court would retain discretion to deny Charles relief after he faithfully
completed his sentence and probation, it was incumbent upon it to include those terms. Neither

22

the district court nor the State may now insert new terms in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. The
district court improperly based its decisions on the new terms pertaining to Michele's alleged
"fear." Costilow, 318 S.W.3d at 537 ("A trial court exceeds its authority when it inserts
additional, non-negotiated terms"). Thus, the State "must bear the responsibility for any lack of
clarity" pertaining to when Charles' guilty plea would be set aside. Peterso11, 148 Idaho at 596.
The foregoing facts and authorities illustrate why Rule 11 Plea Agreements are
interpreted in favor of defendants with a focus on their reasonable understanding. Although the
State included specific terms to address Charles' breaches of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, it did
not include any terms that support its present position or the district court's decisions. (App., A,
p. 1-3; R. Vol. II, p. 260-62A.) Under any of the above arguments or the totality of them all, the
State and district court have breached the terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and it should be
specifically enforced in favor of Charles in accordance with his reasonable understanding with
the State bearing the responsibility for the lack of clarity. Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596-97;
Roherts, 624 F.3d at 245-46 ("To assess whether a plea agreement has been violated, this court

considers ... the defendant's reasonable understanding.")' The district cOUlt should be reversed
with instructions to set aside his guilty plea, dismiss this action and restore all of his civil rights.
Id; Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262; Barkley, 125 Idaho at 865; I.e. § 19-2604(1); Section IV(F).
B. Charles' due process rights were violated when the promise that induced him to
plead guilty was not honored.

No person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Idaho Const. art. 1, § 13; U.S. CONST. Amend XIV, § I.
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It is well established that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise
or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement
or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. This principal is derived from
the Due Process Clause and the fundamental rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea
must be both voluntary and intelligent. If the prosecution has breached its promise
given in a plea agreement, whether that breach was intentional or inadvertent, it
cannot be said that the defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary, for the
defendant has been led to plead guilty on a false promise. In such an event, the
defendant will be entitled to relief. As a remedy, the court may order specific
performance of the agreement or may permit the defendant to withdraw the guilty
plea.

State v. Stocks, 2012 WL 2053594 *2 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). "Allowing the
government to breach a promise that induced a guilty plea violates due process." Margalli-

Olvera, 43 FJd at 351 (emphasis added); Yellow, 627 F.3d at 709 ("to breach a promise that
induced a guilty plea violates due process and undermines the honor of the government, public
confidence in the fair administration of justice") (emphasis added). "Focusing on the defendant's

reasonable understanding also reflects the proper constitutional focus on what induced the
defendant to plead guilty." Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596 (emphasis added); Roberts, 624 F.3d at
245-46 ("To assess whether a plea agreement has been violated, this court considers ... the
defendant's reasonable understanding.") (emphasis added).
The district court erred and abused its discretion when it refused to enforce the Rule 11
Plea Agreement focusing on Charles' undisputed reasonable understanding, which was accepted
by the district court and the State without qualification or objection. (App., A-B, C, p. 76-78, 85,
119 & E, p. 3-5.) Notably, there are no findings for this Court to review because the district court
never addressed the due process argument and failed to make any of the required findings of fact.
(App., E; Tr., 8-43.) See Jacobson, 150 Idaho at 134-35. Likewise, the State conceded the due
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process arguments by failing to even respond. (R. Vol. II, p. 260-62A.) Charles' due process
rights have been violated by being induced to plead guilty based upon a promise that has not
been fulfilled-the promise to set aside his guilty plea and restore his civil rights upon his
completion of probation as set forth in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and as reasonably
understood by him. (App., A-B & C, p. 76-78; R. Vol. II, p. 247-50,

~~9-14;

Section IV(A)(2).)

He is being deprived of life and liberty, including the restoration of all of his civil rights. (ld;
Section IV(F).) Neither the State nor the district court has disputed Charles' reasonable

understanding regarding the promise that induced him to plead guilty and waive his rights:
I was aware that I had the option of having my case decided by [a] jury, but r
wished to accept responsibility for my actions, pay the price and then be rewarded
for doing so. I carefully reviewed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement prior to signing it.
It was explained to me by my attorney and I understood that if I complied with all
of the terms and conditions in that Rule 11 Plea Agreement (including up to five
years of probation), then I would be permitted to have my guilty plea set aside,
this action dismissed and my civil rights restored, and there would be nothing on
my previously unblemished criminal record. Based upon my understanding that I
would receive a withheld judgment and that my guilty plea would be set aside in
no more than five years if I complied with all the terms of my sentence and
probation under the terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement (and that no trace of this
action would be on my record), I agreed to wave my right to a jury trial and pled
guilty to one of the three charges.

I cherish my civil rights. Having my civil rights is extremely important to me and
this is one of the material reasons why I agreed to be bound by the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement. I wanted to be able to once again enjoy all my civil liberties. I
understood my obligations under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and pledged to
comply with those obligations. In return, I had the expectation that if I complied
with my obligations that I would be permitted to withdraw my guilty plea, have
this case dismissed and have my cherished civil rights restored.
(R. Vol. II, p. 246,

~~4

& 6.) Prior to accepting the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, the district court

confirmed Charles' reasonable understanding of the terms of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement:
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(The Court):

And my understanding is that you're pleading pursuant to a Rule 11
Agreement; is that correct?

(The Defendant): Yes.
(The Court):

Why don't you explain to me what your understanding is of what
will happen to you ifI accept that plea.

(The Defendant): Well, my understanding is there will be a pre sentencing
investigation and then a sentencing hearing.
(The Court):

And do you understand that the agreement contemplates that you
would receive a withheld judgment as a result of pleading !:,'Uilty to
this charge?

(The Defendant): Yes, sir.
(The Court):

Do you know what a "withheld judgment" means?

(The Defendant):

Yes.

(The Court):

Why don't you explain to me what you're understanding is?

(The Defendant): Well, I mean that - I guess, I'd explain that - my understanding of
the entire agreement is that I - that I am pleading guilty to this
charge and that I will spend - my punishment will include 30 days
in Latah County jail. I will pay a $1,000 fine. And I'm pleading
guilty to one of the - one of the felony charges. I'll have a year
probation, and if I fulfill the period of probation without any
problems in that period of time, that the felony charges would -would be dropped.
(The Court):

Well, Mr. Guess, the -- I think you understand what a withheld
judgment means. It means that if you comply with your terms and
conditions of probation that at the conclusion of the period of
probation, which is for a period of no more than five years,
according to the agreement, that you could come in and petition to
have your guilty plea, which you tendered today, withdrawn and
the charge against you dismissed. Do you understand that?

(The Defendant): I do, yes.
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(App., C, p. 76, L. 21-25, p. 77, L. 1-23 & p. 78, L. 8-16.) Neither the State nor the district court
ever disputed Charles' testimony regarding his reasonable understanding of the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement-and the district court agreed with Charles. (App., C, p 76-78; R. Vol. II, p. 26062A.) Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596. Instead, they both now offer their own interpretations of the
Rule 11 Plea Agreement-neither of which considered Charles' undisputed reasonable

understanding or the written tenns of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (fd; App., A, p. 1-3.) Thus,
Charles' guilty plea rested on a false promise, and, therefore, was not knowing and voluntary.?

Stocks, *2. Under the totality of circumstances, he has been deprived of life and liberty under the
Due Process Clause. Jacobson, 150 Idaho at 134-35; ld. Obviously, Charles would not have pled
guilty ifhe had known that the promise that induced him to plead guilty would not be honored:
Had I known before I executed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement that after I completed
the tenns and conditions required under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Order
Withholding Judgment that I would not have the right to set aside my guilty plea,
have this action dismissed and have my civil rights restored, I would never had
executed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement or pled guilty to any of the charges against
me. I would have proceeded to trial.
(R. Vol. II, p. 249,

~12.)

The State and district court have breached the promises that they made to Charles to
induce him to plead guilty. (App., A-B & C, p. 76-78; Sections IV(A)(2) & (F).) Although the
determination of whether the breaches were intentional or inadvertent is irrelevant, the State
clearly breached is duty of good faith and fair dealing to ensure that Charles' reasonable

understanding was honored. 5/ee US. v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("The plea

9

Notably, until Charles' guilty plea is set aside. he is considered a convicted felon. Sharp. 145 Idaho 403.
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agreement ... includes an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing"). Because Charles has
completed his sentence and probation, specific performance of his reasonable understanding of
the Rule 11 Plea Agreement is the only appropriate remedy. HOI'k!ey, 125 Idaho at 865;

San/obello, 404 U.S. at 262. Accordingly, the Court should rectify the violation of Charles' due
process lights by reversing the district court with instructions to set aside his guilty plea, dismiss
this action and restore all of his civil rights. I.e. § 19-2604( 1); Section IV(F). (App., A-B & E.)
C. The district court erred when it found that it was not "compatible with the public

interest" to set aside Charles' guilty plea under I.C. § 19-2604(1).
"The purpose of an order withholding judgment, as an alternative to a conviction, is to
allow the defendant an opportunity to rehabilitate himself and thereby avoid the burden of a
criminal record." State v. Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825, 828, 172 P.3d 1100, 1103 (2007)

(ahrogated on other ground,'); Medley, 73 Idaho at 479. See I.C § 19-2604(1). A district court
has authority to withhold judgment and set aside the guilty plea:
... if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause for continuing
the peliod of probation, and if it be compatible with public interest, terminate
sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and finally
dismiss the case and discharge the defendant...[which] shall have the effect of
restoring the defendant to his civil rights.
I.C § 19-2604(1). On September 1, 2011, Charles completed his five-year period of probation
and as of that date he had complied with every term and condition of sentence and probation
imposed upon him. (R Vo!' II, p. 176, ,-r,-r2-4 & p. 247-49, ,-r,-r9 & 11.) On December 23, 2011,
the district court entered an order discharging Charles from probation.]() (App., D, p. 2.) The

10 Charles was on probation for atieast 114 days longer than authorized under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement
and in violation ofIdaho law. (App., A. p. 2 & B, p. 2; Section IV(D).) See I.e. § 18-906; I.e. § 19-2601(7).
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district court found: that "there have been no adjudicated probations violations" that it was
"convinced that there is no longer cause for continuing probation," that Charles "has fully
complied with every court-imposed term and condition of his probation," and that "I have a
defendant who has performed as well as any defendant I can remember while on probation."
(App., C, p. 56, L. 20-21 & E, p. 6.) Despite these findings and the legislature's intent for
withheld judgments, the district court erred by finding that it was not "compatible with the public
interest" to grant relief under I.C. § 19-2604(1)11 (App., C, p. 56-57, D, p. 2 & E, p. 5-7.)

1. The district court erred when it held that Michele's alleged "fear" was a basis to
find that it was not "compatible with the public interest" under I.e. § 19-2604(1).
First, the district court erred because it must have implicitly found it to be "compatible
with the public interest" when it accepted the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and entered the resulting
Order Withholding Judgment. (App. D-E.) In fact, the district court made the express finding that
"the interests of justice would be best served if the entry of judgment were withheld and the
defendant placed on probation to the Idaho State Board of Correction." (App., B, p. 2.) Although
the district court later backed away from that finding (Tr., p. 36-37), Charles asserts that it could
not have accepted the Rule 11 Plea Agreement or entered the Order Withholding Judgment if it
was not "compatible with the public interest." Notably, if Charles had violated any terms of
probation or any other term of the Rule 11 Plea Agreement or Order Withholding Judgment, the
court could have re-visited "compatible with the public interest." (App., A, p. 3 & B, p. 2-8.) In
sum, there must be something more than a victim's "fear" to support denying relief to Charles

11 Interestingly, Judge Stegner was also the district court judge in Hanes 1, 137 Idaho 440. Hanes 11, 139
Idaho 392 and Stale v. Schumacher, 131 Idaho 484, 959 P.2d 465 (el. App. 1998).
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under I.e. § 19-2604(1 )-assuming that Michele's alleged "fear" was a basis to deny relief under
I.e. §19-2604(1)-"fear" well known to the district cOUli when it accepted the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement. (App., A & C, p. 109, L. 5-7; Tr. p. 107-08.) If the district court or the State was
concerned about Michele's ongoing alleged "fear" or whether that alleged "fear" would be a
basis to deny Charles relief, the State should have included specific tenns in the Rule 11 Plea
Agreement addressing the issue or the district court should have rejected the plea as provided
under I.e.R. 11(f), but no such terms were included and the district court accepted the Rule 11
Plea Agreement withollt qualification. Since Charles complied with probation and better than
"any defendant [the district court could] remember while on probation" (App., C, p. 56, L. 2021), the plain and rationale meaning of I.e. § 19-2604(1), interpreted to not render an absurd
result, dictates that the district cOUli had no discretion to deny relief. Medley, 73 Idaho at 479
("To withhold judgment. .. protects the defendant at that time against the stigma of a conviction
which may be forever avoided should the defendant conform to its terms and conditions.").
Second, the district court misapplied the law when it determined that a victim's "fear"
supported a finding that it was not "compatible with the public interest." (App., D, p. 2 & E, p. 57.) Although never squarely addressed by this Court, the meaning of "compatible with the public
interest" can be ascertained from other authorities. See Breakzone Billiards v. City of Torrance,
81 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1246 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) ("traffic, parking, safety, noise and nuisance
problems; these clearly represent concerns ... of the public interest. .. "); Slate v. Wagenius, 99
Idaho 273,286,581

P.2d 319 (1978) (Bistline, J.

dissenting)

C... the

successful

completion ... [of] probation ... should result in ... being 'compatible with the public interest''');

30

State v. Chambers, 533 P.2d 876, 878-29 (Utah 1975). "Public interest" means:
The general welfare of the public that warrants recognition and
protection ... Something in which the public as a whole has a stake; esp., an
interest that justifies governmental regulation.
Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1350 (9th ed. 2004). In Slale v. Wagenilfs, the dissent addressed
"compatible with public the interest" (although it was not at issue):
Clearly, the successful completion of two years of a three year probation period,
during which she was subject to the constant threat of 30 days' incarceration in
the Kootenai County jail, together with some bona fide effort at restitution, should
result in a dismissal and discharge as being "compatible with the public interest."

Wagenills, 99 Idaho at 286 (Bistline, J. dissenting). In ,')'tate v. ('hambers, the Utah Supreme
Court squarely addressed the meaning of "if it be compatible with the public interest."
In the exercise of these broad discretionary powers, which are clearly allowed to
encourage reformation of wrongdoers, the court must consider a great many
intangibles, such as the character and personality traits of the defendant, his
attitude, his prior record, his performance under probation, and whether he has
acquitted himself well in accepting the duties his society requires. If this
discretion is reasonably used, and is not shown to have been abused, arbitrary, or
capricious, the judgment of the trial court should not be disturbed.

Chambers, 533 P.2d at 879 (foot notes omitted).
Here, Charles complied with all conditions of his five-year period of probation, served
thirty days in jail, paid all restitution, completed community service, paid all fines and had no
violations during several customary unannounced visits by probation officers to his home. (R.
Vo!' II, p. 247-49,

~~9

& 11.) He was given additional travel liberties and placed on

unsupervised probation based upon his performance. (fd; R. Vo!' II, p. 171-72.) The district court
found: "Mr. Guess is clearly contrite ... remorseful...[and) has done all that he can do in
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order to be awarded relief." (App., C, p. 39, L. 9-11.) Charles' Psychologist, without
compensation, stated: "At no time in our counseling sessions has he ever expressed wanting to
hann his ex-wife in any way ... .I do not believe that he currently poses a threat to her." (R. Vol.
II, p. 183 & 252,

~19.)

But Michele's "fear" was the sole reason Judge Stegner denied relief:

(Mr. Bond):

... so that I know I understood you right, did you say earlier that
if Michele didn't object, then you would grant the relief?

(The Court):

I did ... Whether that is possible is anybody's guess.

(Mr. Bond):

So, that's what you're really hinging the -- the compatible with
public interest is, whether if Michele is -- your concern over
Michele?

(The Court):

That's my current reservation.

(App., C, p. 41, L. 15-21, 24-25, p. 42, L. 1-2 (emphasis added).) Neither "fear" nor "victim" are
words in I.C. §§19-2601(3) or 19-2604(1). Likewise, there are no words or language that a
victim has a right to object or consent to relief under I. C. § 19-2604( 1). Hailes II, 139 Idaho at
394 ("The statute does not contain the word 'willfully"'); Manners v. Bd. of Veteril1aJY Med.,
107 Idaho 950,952,694 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1985) ("Nowhere in that statute is there language ... ").
This Court should decline to adopt any form of Michele's "fear" as being a basis for detennining
"compatible with the public interest" because it would empower the Judge and the victim with
unlimited discretion, which would be contrary to the legislature's intent to reform. (App., C, p.
41, L. 15-18,20-21,24-25, p. 42, L. 1-13.) Medley, 73 Idaho at 479; Parkinson, 144 Idaho at

828. Other than Michele's statement at the first hearing (which was not an objection), no
evidence was submitting opposing or objecting to granting Charles relief. (App., C, p. 55, L. 6-
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24; Tr., p. 8-43 & 49-57.) The district court found: "Mr. Guess is clearlv contrite. He's
I"emorseful. He has done all that he can do in order to be awarded the relief that he seeks
today," that "there have been no adjudicated probations violations," it was "convinced that there
is no longer cause for continuing probation," Charles "has fully complied with every courtimposed tern1 and condition of his probation," and "I have a defendant who has performed as
well as any defendant I can remembel" while on probation." (App., C, p. 39, L. 9-11, p. 56, L.
20-21 & E, p. 6 (emphasis added).) See Chambers, 533 P.2d at 879. Finally, there is no evidence
that he poses a risk to anyone, including Michele (who has not resided in Idaho for over seven
years) and fourteen letters were submitted in support of him. (R. Vol. II, p. 179-209.) Notably,
Charles had no prior criminal record and the State conceded that it "cannot recall any other case
where a defendant complied with his probation and did not receive Idaho Code 19-2604 relief."
(R. Vol. II, p. 245,

~3,

p. 261.) Instead, the only finding supported by the record was that it was

"compatible with public interest" to grant Charles relief. 12 The district court misapplied the law,
abused its discretion and did not exercise reason when it found that it was not "compatible with
the public interest" to grant him relief based upon Michele's alleged "fear." (App., D-E.) I.e. §

19-2604(1); Wagenius, 99 Idaho at 286; Chambers, 533 P.2d at 879; Hanes II, 139 Idaho at 394.
2. Michele's "fear" may not be re-litigated and the district court's finding that it was
"not compatible with the public interest" was not supported by any evidence.
Findings of fact must be supported by substantial and competent evidence, which is
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
12 With all due respect to the district court and Michele, if the standard for obtaining relief is whether the
victim consents or still has fear of the defendant guilty pleas would neyer be set aside becanse no victim would
likely eyer consent-which is precisely why I.e. § 19-260..J.( 1) does not contain the words "victim" or "fear."
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Byington, 132 Idaho at 592-593.
The district court erred by denying Charles relief based upon Michele's "fear" as being
not "compatible with the public interest." (App., D & E, p. 5-7; Tr., p. 37-43,49-57.) There was
no evidence to support a finding of "fear" or any other basis to deny relief. I.e. § 19-2604(1).
First, the district court and State are collaterally estopped from re-litigating Michele's
"fear"-the same "fear" present at the time the Rule 11 Plea Agreement was accepted-which
involves the same parties, the identical issue of "fear" that was previously litigated, the issue of
"fear" was fairly litigated and the Order Withholding Judgment was entered. (App., B.) See State

v. Powell, 120 Idaho 707,708,819 P.2d 561, 562 (1991); 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 198
(2011). Michele's "fear" is what resulted in Charles being sentenced to five years of probation:
However, given the seriousness of the crime, and the fear that Ms. Guess fears or has for Mr. Guess, T ask that you impose the full five years' probation to
protect and give Ms. Guess a feeling of safety, at least in that five years of
probation.
(App., A, p. 2 & C, p. 115, L. 10-14.) Neither the State nor the district court had reserved the
right to use Michele's "fear" as a basis to deny relief to Charles after he completed probation and
there were no such temls in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (Tr., p. 63-88 & 104-126; App., A.)
The State conceded that it could not "recall any other case where a defendant complied with his
probation and did not receive Idaho Code 19-2604 relief' and that "practically speaking, the
State would expect that the COUIt would grant the relief." (R. Vol. II, p. 261-262.) Ifher alleged
fear was such an important issue to the district court or the State, they both should have rejected
the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. See I.e.R. I 1(f). Once the district court found that "there have been
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no adjudicated probations violations," that it was "convinced that there is no longer canse for
continuing probation," that Charles "has fully complied with every court-imposed term and
condition of his probation," and that "I have a defendant who has performed as well as any
defendant I can remember while on probation," it confimled that there was no basis to find any
new "fear." (App., C, p. 56, L. 20-21 & E, p. 6 (emphasis added).) Assuming that "fear" was an
element of I.e. § 19-2604(1), absent evidence that Charles has done something new, the district
court's discretion is "shown to have been abused, arbitrary, [and] capricious." Chambers, 533
P.2d at 879. The time to use Michele's "fear" as a basis to deny relief has long passed and may
not be re-litigated. (App., D-E; Tr. 8-43,49-57; Section IV(D).) See Powell, 120 Idaho at 708.
Second, although the district erred when it never addressed "compatible with the public
interest" in Charles' first Motion (App., D; Tr., p. 49-57), it also erred when it found that it was
not "compatible with the public interest" in his second Motion. (App., E, p. 5-7.)
The fact that one of the victims in this case still fears the party who is seeking the
extraordinary relief granted by I. e. § 19-2604(1) is no small issue for this Court.
This Court acknowledges that Guess is on the right track to obtaining the relief he
seeks, which is why this Court indicated that it would be willing to revisit this
issue in the future. The determination that Guess should be granted relief under
I.e. § 19-2604(1) is not entirely dependent on Michele's acquiescence. Such
acquiescence may never occur. Nonetheless, this Court is unwilling to disregard
her fear of the Defendant and her objection to him being granted relief pursuant to
I. e. § 19-2604(1), at this time. Because this Court finds that it would not be
compatible with the public interest to set aside Guess's plea of guilty, dismiss his
case, and restore his civil rights, it declines to do so.
(App., E, p. 6-7; see also App., C, p. 38-42.) The foregoing findings were not supported by
substantial and competent evidence. A victim's "fear" is not a basis to deny relief and "fear" is
not a word in I.e. § 19-2604(1). Hanes 11, 139 Idaho at 394 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The statute does
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not contain the word 'willfully'''); lvfanners, 107 Idaho at 952 ("Nowhere in that statute is there
language ... "). Thus, the district court erred by misapplying the law. Assuming that a victim's
"fear" was relevant, the proof of objective "fear" required to prove "self.-defense" is instructive.
The appellant's fear alone is not a legally sufficient reason upon which to base an
inference that appellant acted in self-defense. Accompanied by the appellant's
perception of the situation, there must be in addition to circumstances sufficient to
excite the fears of a reasonable man. Thus an objective and not a subjective
criterion must be applied when inquiring into appellant's state of mind.
State v. Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 286,291,460 P.2d 711, 716 (1969) (citation omitted). Here, there is

simply no evidence to support Michele's alleged fear. There is no objective evidence or
allegations of any act or omission by Charles over the past five years that would support an
o~jective finding of "fear."l3 Charles never violated the No Contact Order. (R. Vol. I, p. 64;

App., B & E, p. 6.) The No Contact Order expired on August 31,2011, and Charles has not made
any "contact" with Michele since that time.!4 Notably, Michele never sought to modify the No
Contact Order to extend it based upon her alleged "fear." See I.C.R 46.2(b) ("A victim of a
criminal offense for which a no contact order has issued may request modification ... of that order
by filing a written request ... "). Michele's failure to seek an extension indicates that she is not
afraid. Certainly, if she truly feared Charles, she would have at least requested an extension to
the No Contact Order as provided under I.C.R 46.2(b). Indeed, Charles' and Michele's adult son
advised the district court that "[i]n my communications with my mother she has had no objection
to full reinstatement of his civil liberties." (R. Vo!' n, p. 181.) Michele was provided a copy of
13 If Charles had acted to renew Michele's fear (i.e., stalking, making contact, etc.), he would have violated
probation and/or the No Contact Order and no relief would have been available to him. (App., A p. 3.)
14 In fact. Charles' Psychologist stated that Charles "left [himJ with the impression that he has no desire to
have any additional contact with her, except in the context of co-parenting their son." (R. Vol. II, p. 183.)
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her son's letter and she never disputed his statements. (R. Vol. II, p. 262A.) In addition, shortly
after the charges were filed in 2006, Michele and Charles were left alone during the divorce
proceedings and "[t]here were times in which Michele and Charles laughed.,,15 (R. Vol. II, p.
258,

~~4-5.)

Charles' Psychologist stated that Charles has never "expressed wanting to harm his

ex-wife in any way" and that he did "not believe that he currently poses a threat to her." (R. Vol.
II, p. 183.) Despite these facts, Michele never disputed any of them: "I still have some fear" and
"I, as a victim, will always be in fear." (App., C, p. 55, L. 17-18,22-23.) Michele never appeared

in any manner at the second hearing, although the State provided her with copies of the filings.
(Tr., p. 8-43; R. Vol. IT, p. 262A.) In fact, Michele did not fOimally object at either hearing,
despite the district court's finding that she did. (Tr., p. 8-43 & 49-57.) Lastly, the district court's
finding that: "I have a defendant who has performed as well as any defendant 1 can
remember while on probation" does not support the finding of fear or that it is not "compatible
with the public interest" to grant Charles relief. (App., C, p. 56, L. 20-21 (emphasis added).)
Therefore, there are no facts or evidence that supports an objective finding of fear-let
alone any finding of fear. In fact, there was no evidence to support the district court's findings.
(App., D & E, p. 6-7.) I.e. § 19-2604(1). The district court's finding of "fear" may have been, at
most, a basis to extend the No Contact Order, but Michele never requested an extension. See
I.e.R. 46.2(b). However, no reasonable mind would accept as adequate the above facts to
support an

15

o~jective

or subjective finding of "fear" to support the conclusion that it was not

The No Contact Order did not apply to the divorce legal proceedings. (App .. C, p. 120, L. 14.)

37

"compatible with public interest" to grant Charles relief under I.C § 19-2604(1 ).16 Byillgton, 132
Idaho at 592-593; Griffith, 140 Idaho at 484 (the statute "authorizes a trial court to set aside the
plea of guilty ... if judgment has been withheld and ... the defendant makes a satisfactory showing
that he has complied with the terms ... [of] probation."). The district court should be reversed with
instructions to enter an order finding that it is "compatible with the public interest" to set aside
Charles' guilty plea, dismiss this action and restore his civil rights. I.C § 19-2604(1).
D. The district court had no jurisdiction to indefinitely withhold judgment and its
actions constitute an illegal sentence.
A court may "[w ]ithhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe
and may place the defendant on probation." I.C § 19-2601(3).
The court has power in the exercise of its discretion to withhold judgment for a
reasonable time for any purpose and, where this is done, jurisdiction is retained
during the period of probation; on the other hand, the power of the court to
indefinitely suspend the pronouncement of sentence or the withholding of
judgment is denied ...

Medley, 73 Idaho at 483-84. "[A] trial COUlt's power to withhold judgment in any given case is
not unlimited and may properly be constrained within the confines of the enabling statute." 5;tate
V.

Branson, 128 Idaho 790,791,919 P.2d 319, 320 (1996). "The court may correct an illegal

sentence at any time." I.CR. 35. For aggravated assault, the maximum sentence is five years of
imprisonment or five years of probation. I.C § 18-906; I.C § 19-2601(7).
First, the district court erred when it refused to set aside Charles' guilty plea because it
had no jurisdiction to indefinitely suspend the Order Withholding Judgment. (App., B, D-E.)

16 I.e. § 19-260-'1(1) was amended after Charles pled guilty. The changes are irrelevant, howeyer, because
Charles complied with all tenns of probation and meets the criteria under both version one. § 19-260-'l( 1).
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Once Charles complied with all terms and conditions of sentence and probation imposed upon
him in the Order Withholding Judgment, the district court had no jurisdiction or authorization to
unilaterally and indefinitely extend that Order Withholding Judgment or to essentially extend
probation under I.C. § 19-2601(3). (App., D-E.) Once the court found that it was "convinced

that there is no longer cause of continuing probation" and that Charles "has done all that he
can do in order to be awarded the relief he seeks today after completing probation, the district
court abused its discretion when it denied relief to him and it had no authority to indefinitely
suspend the Order Withholding Judgment under I.e. § 19-2604(1). (App., C, p. 39, L. 10-11 &
E, p. 6 (emphasis added).). Medley, 73 Idaho at 483-84; Bransoll, 128 Idaho 790,791; I.e. § 192601(3); I.e. § 19-1604(1). When Charles' counsel requested clarification as to when he could
expect relief, the district stated: "I can't tell you when that time will be" thereby confinning
the indefinite period of suspension of the Order Withholding Judgment. Id (App., B & C, p. 38,
L. 19-20 & D-E.) Thus, the two orders indefinitely withholding judgment should be reversed are

void. [ute, 150 Idaho at 840 ("orders made without subject matter jurisdiction are void").
Second, the district court's decisions indefinitely withholding judgment and requiring
Charles to do the same things while on probation constitutes an illegal sentence. (App., D-E.)
(Mr. Bond):

Okay. Okay. And -- and just so that Charles knows, is there -- is
there anything else that he needs to be doing to somehow help the
process along or just continue to be a law abiding citizen?

(The Court):

Continue to be a law abiding citizen. Continue to do the things
that he's done in the time that he's been on probation. As I
said, I don't think I've ever seen a showing as positive as I saw for
Mr. Guess.
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(App., C, p. 42, L. 3-10 (emphasis added).) Significantly, Charles was on probation for 114 days
longer than authorized under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Idaho law. (App., A, p. 2, & D, p.
2.) r.e.R. 35; I.e. § 18-906; I.e. § 19-2601(7). Thus, the additional 114 days of probation and
the district court's decision requiring Charles to indefinitely "continue to do the things that he's
done in the time that he's been on probation" constitute illegal sentences. ld. The Court should
correct those illegal sentences by reversing with instructions to set aside Charles' guilty plea,
terminate his probation and restore his civil rights mille pro tllnc to September 1, 2011.
E. The Rule 11 Plea Agreement prevails over I.e. §§ 19-2601(3) and 19-2604(1).
"[W]here conflict exists between statutory criminal provisions and the Idaho Criminal
Rules in matters of procedure, the rules will prevail." 5/tate v. Curringtoll, 108 Idaho 539, 541,
700 P.2d 942, 944 (1985). See I.C.R. 11(f); I.e. §§ 19-2601(3) and 19-2604(1)
The district court erred when it did not find that the Rule 11 Plea Agreement prevailed
over I.e. §§ 19-2601(3) and 19-2604(1). (App., E.) Charles complied with the required terms of
probation and sentence set forth in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement. (App., A; R. Vol. II, p. 247-49,
~~9

& 11.) I.e.R. II(f). Based upon one or more of the arguments in Sections IV(A)-(B), CD) &

(F), the only issue is the procedural step of setting aside his guilty plea, dismissing this action,

and restoring his civil rights. There are no tern1S of that Rule 11 Plea Agreement indicating
otherwise and Charles' reasonable understanding governs the interpretation of that Agreement.
(App., A; Sections IV(A)-(B) & (F).) Petersoll, 148 Idaho at 596. Once the Court accepted the
Rule 11 Plea Agreement, entered the resulting Order Withholding Judgment and Charles
complied willi the required sentence and probation, the remaining issue is purely the procedural
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step of setting aside his guilty plea and restoring his civil rights. I.C. § 19-2604(1). It is implicit
thatthe Rule 11 Plea Agreement was authorized by I.e. §§ 19-2601(3) and 19-2604(1). Thus, the
Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Charles' reasonable understanding of that Agreement prevail over
I.C §§ 19-2601(3) and 19-2604(1). Currington, 108 Idaho at 541. Section IV(A)(2).

F.

The district court's refusal to restore Charles' civil rights violates Idaho law, the
Rule 11 Plea Agreement, federal law and his constitutional rights.
"The purpose of an order withholding judgment, as an alternative to a conviction, is to

allow the defendant an opportunity to rehabilitate himself and thereby avoid the burden of a
criminal record." Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 828. "The final dismissal of the case as herein
provided shall have the effect of restoring the defendant with his civil rights." I.e. § 19-2604(1).
There are no limits or conditions on the rights which a defendant regains. Manners, 107 Idaho at
952. "[W]here a judgment has been vacated, it is a nullity, and the effect is as ifit had never been
rendered at all." State v. Barwick, 94 Idaho 139, 143,483 P.2d 670,674 (1971). A conviction for
which a person has had his civil rights restored under the law of the convicting jurisdiction is not
considered a conviction for the purposes of federal law. 18 U.S.e. § 921(1)(20). Idaho law does
not expressly limit or deny the restoration of the right to possess, ship, receive or transport
firearms when a guilty plea has been set aside. I.e. § 18-310(2).
Here, the district court erred when it refused to set aside Charles' guilty plea and restore
all of his civil rights, including his right to possess firearms P (App., D-E.) The district court's
decisions and the State's arguments fail for three separate reasons. (Jd; R. Vol. II, p. 262.)

17 Charles is an avid hunter and outdoors man and he cherishes his civil rights. which was a key inducement
to him pleading guilty pursuant [0 the Rule II Plea Agreement. (R. Vol. II. p. 19-1 & p. 2-l5-+6, ~~4 & 6.)
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First, under Idaho law, there are no limitations regarding the civil rights that are restored
to a defendant after a guilty plea is set aside.

I.e.

§ 19-2604(1); Manners, 107 Idaho at 952

("Nowhere in that statute is there language which limits or conditions the rights which a
defendant regains."). In fact,

I.e.

§ 19-2604(1) specificalIy calIs for the restoration of alI civil

rights and it must be construed in favor of Charles. The legislature's intent was to reform
defendants and allow them to avoid any burdens of a criminal record, including the restoration of
the right to possess firearms. Since Charles has complied with alI conditions imposed upon him,
his guilty plea should be set aside, this action dismissed and all of this civil rights restored. Id
Any other interpretation of I.e. § 19-2604( I) would result in improperly construing that statute
against Charles and would further constitute an interpretation contrary to the legislature's intent,
an absurd result and violate the plain and rationale meaning of I.e. § 19-2604(1). See Section Ill.
Second, under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement, the State did not include any terms or
conditions limiting which civil rights would be restored or that the right to bear firearms would
be subject to any limitations, including

I.e.

§ 18-310. (App., A.) Charles was induced to plead

guilty pursuant to the Rule 11 Plea Agreement with the reasonable understanding that all of his
civil rights would be restored.
Had I known before I executed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement that after I completed
the terms and conditions required under the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Order
Withholding Judgment that I would not have the right to set aside my guilty plea,
have this action dismissed and have my civil rights restored, I would never had
executed the Rule 11 Plea Agreement or pled guilty to any of the charges against
me. I would have proceeded to trial.
(R. Vol. II, p. 249,

~12;

App., C, p. 76-78.) While the State did not object or respond to the
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restoration of Charles' civil rights in his first motion (R Vol. II, p. 174; Tr., 49-57), at the next
hearing the State asserted that Charles' civil rights have been restored, "with the exception of his
right to possess firearms (for which he will need to petition the Parole Commission at a future
date)." (R. Vol. II, p. 262.) Nevertheless, it does not dispute or address Charles' reasonable

understanding that all of his rights would be restored. (R. Vol. II, p. 260-62A.) The State is
attempting to impermissibly insert new terms in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement in violation of due
process. (Id; App., A.) See Costilow, 318 S.W.3d at 537; U.S. CON ST. Amend XIV, § 1; Idaho
Const. art. 1, § 13. The State previously addressed firearms requesting that the district court
"impose as a specific term of probation, again, to help alleviate some of Ms. Guess's fears that
Mr. Guess not be allowed to possess any firearms." (App., C, p. 115, L. 15-17.) The State did not
take its current position at that hearing. (Id; R Vol. 11, p. 262.) The State did not include any
terms that limited or barred Charles' right to possess firearms in the Rule 11 Plea Agreement.
(App., A; Tr., 63-88 & 104-126.) Likewise, the district court could have rejected the plea over
any concern about the restoration of the right to possess fireanns, but it failed to do so. (App., AB.) l.C.R 11(f). At a minimum, the Rule 11 Plea Agreement is vague and ambiguous since it
does not specifically address firearms and it must be construed in favor of Charles based upon
his reasonable understanding-which is the proper constitutional focus since the restoration of
his rights was part of the inducement for him to plead guilty. (App., A & C, p. 76-78, R. Vol. II,
p. 245-46,

~4;

Sections VI(A)-(B).) Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596. Tn addition, the same arguments

and authorities in Sections IV(A)-(B) apply here to the restoration of Charles' civil rights. The
State must bear the responsibility for any lack of clarity. Id. Finally, the State and district court
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are collaterally estopped from re-litigating any limitation of Charles' right to possess firearms
under the same analysis set forth in Section IV(C)(2)--that issue was laid to rest and fairly
litigated when the district court accepted the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and they are barred from
re-Iitigating that issue now. Powell, 120 Idaho at 708. The State and district court have breached
the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and Charles is entitled to specific performance of his reasonable
lInderstaflding~that

all of his civil rights would be restored. 5'ee Sections III & IV(A)-(B).

Third, Charles has a right under United States Constitution and federal law to bear
fiream1s once his guilty plea is set aside-since Idaho law does not expressly bar or limit him
from possessing firearms, and, in fact, restores all of his civil rights. I.e. § 19-2604(1); Hanes II,
139 Idaho at 394 ("The statute does not contain the word 'willfully"'); Manners, 107 Idaho at

952;

u.s.

v. Gomez, 911 F.2d 219, 222 (9th 1990) ("Because Idaho has no such express

provision in its code, we must overturn Gomez's conviction");

u.s. v. Erlvin, 902 F .2d 510, 513

(7th Cir. 1990) ("A state must tell the felon point blank that weapons are not kosher"); 18 USe.

§ 921(1)(20); U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 11; U.S. CONST. Amend IT; I.C. 18-310(2). There are no
Idaho laws or statutes (including I.e. § 18-310(2» that limit or prevent a defendant with a
dismissed withheld judgment from having all of his civil rights restored, including the right to
bear arms. Once an order is entered setting aside Charles' guilty plea and dismissing this action,
Charles' civil rights are fully restored under Idaho law, including his right to bear firearms under
both Idaho and federal law. Id. Furthermore, his right to bear firearms under federal law and the
United States Constitution trumps any lack of clarity or statute under Idaho law. Id.
Accordingly, there is no basis under the Idaho law, federal law or the Rule 11 Plea
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Agreement to limit or bar Charles from having all of his civil rights restored, including his right
to bear arms. Charles has honored his end of the bargain and the district court and State should

be required to honor their end. 'R (R . Vol. 11 , p. 247-50, " 19, 11- 14 ; App., E, p. 6.)

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons aIiicu lated above. the Court should reverse the district court's two orders
and remand this case with instructions to set aside Charles' gui lty plea, restore all of his civil
rights and dismiss this action. Because this appeal involves the post-sentence and quasi-civil
matter of enforcing a contract Charles requests an award of costs pursuant to T.A.R. 40.
DATED this 21 51 day June, 2012.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO,

Ol,~

7HE

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

STATE OF' IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
Case No. CR-2006-0001646
V.

RULE 11 PLEA AGREEMENT
CHARLES EARL GUESS,
Defendant.
CO:'1ES NQI'J T:-IE STATE OF IDAHO,
James

E.

Iv1.

Craig,

Dop'Jty

by and through its attorney,

Prosecuting

Attorney,

and

Defendant

CHARLES EARL GUESS, and his attorney, Wynn Mos:rcan, and p,lrsuant to
Rule ll(d) (1) (Cl,

Idaho Criminal R'Jles,

sub~it

the following Plea

Agreenent to the Court for its acceptance or rejection:

RU~E

1.

That the Qefendant shall enter a guilty plea in Latah
County Case CR-2006-0001646 to a
single count of
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT,
Idaho
Code
18-901,
a
felony,
written to include both victims, as stated in the
I1.mendod CrirLinal
Info::::mation
to be
filed
at
the
a::::raignment of the ~atter herein;

2.

That the State and the Defe~dant agree that th~
appropriate disposition of this ~atter is as follows:

11 PLEA

AGREEME~T:

Page -1-
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That the Defendant shall receive a Withheld Judgment
ar.d shall be placed or. probation ~o the Idaho State
Department of Corrections for a period of no more than
five (5) years . Terns of the Defendant ' s probation
shall include :
A.

That th e
of $1 , 000 . 00 ;

Defendant

B.

That the
l ocal ja il;

3.

shall pay a

Defendant

That any other terms of
probation , including (bu t
probation and the amount
subject of this agreement ,
make
what
app ro priate.

shall

serve

fine

in the a mou nt

th irty

(30)

days

sentencing and conditions of
not limited to) the lcr-gth of
of restitution , arc not the

and both part ies "a re free to
recommendations
they
believe
to
be

4.

Defendant understands (a) the nature of the charge to
'tlhieh he agrees to plead gui lt y and acknowledges t h at
he is not being coerced into entering his plea of
guilty ;
(b)
the
consequences
of
pleadir:g
guilty,
incl u d in g the ma ximum penalties tha t may be i mposed and
any mandatory min i mum pena lti es ;
and that
(c)
by
pleadi ng gc:ilt y he vJi ll waiv e his rights to a jury
trial,
to confront
accusers,
and to
refrain
from
incriminati r:g himself .
Defendant further acknmv l edges
that he is satisfied with his lega l representation , has
rev iewed "lith his atto rney all pos sible defenses, and
by
his
plea
of
guilty
vol unt arily
\vaives
those
defenses.
Defendar..t also understands that he has a
r ight to appeal the judgment and sentence of the Court
herein and hereby fre ely and vol unt aril y waives such
appeal rights and his right to app eal any subsequent
decisions
of
the
Court
relative
to
motions
for
r educt i on of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 .

5.

This

lsentered into pursuant to r.C . R .
Defendant under sta nds if the Cour t does
not
accept
the
sentencing
recommendation s
of
the
parties that. he shall be af fo rded the opportuni ty to
withdraw h i s plea of guilty except as provi ded below .
agreement

11 (d) (I) (C) ;

RULE II PLEA

AGR~EMENT:
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6.

Th is

plea

agreement i s based upon th e fac ts and
as they exist at the date of the signing
of
'chis
agreement.
The
defendant
acknow led ges ,
covenants and agrees that during the period of time
betl'/een the date of this agreement and the date of
sent enc ing, he wil l not vio late any law nor fail to
comply \'lith any conditi ons of his release on bond or
othe r
conditions ordered by the Court ,
and shall
cooperate fu ll y wi th any p resen t ence inves ti gat i on
ordered herei n .
Should the efendantin any way breac~
these agreements and covenants , the State is released
from any obligations hereunder regard'ng an appropriaLe
sentencing dis osition,
the Court may senLence the
defendant up to the maxirnwn authorized by _aw and the
defendant shall not be afforded the opporlunity to
·.oJ· thdraw his plea of guilty .
The defendant expressly
agrees that the burden of proof for determining whe the r
the defendan t has br eached any of sa id agreements or
cov ena~t s
shall be a preponderance of the evidence
only .
cir c u~stances

7.

This is the ent i re agreement
the pa rtie s.

IT IS SO

STIPU LATE D this

pros7

l

eputy

unders tand ing between

day of June , 2 0 06 .

--- h~~Jk " -------.
~lYNN

E. t1. C::zAIG

J

b

a~d

lOSf'.1AN

Coun e1 forJlDefenda nt

9

~
.?

.

" ',/~a-r
~
~t-~__~

.' ~

C RLES EARL GUESS
Defendant

RULE 11 PLEA AGREEMENT :

Page -3-

Appendix - A - Page - 3

054

7.0% SEP -6 PM

2~

54

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
Case No. CR-2006-0001646

v.
ORDER WITHHOLDING ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT AND
ORDER OF PROBATION

CHARLES EnRL GUESS,
SSN:
DOB:
Defendant.

On the 31st day of August, 2006, tte defendant, CHARLES EARL
GUESS, defendant's counsel, Wynn Mosman, and the State's

at~orney,

James E. M. Craig, appeared before this Court for pronouncement of
judgment.
At that time the defendant vJas again advised that an Amended
Criminal Information had been filed charging the defendant with the
ORDER WITHHOLDING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
AND ORDER OF PROBATION:
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felony offense of
a felony,

AGG::~.l\'vATED

co:nrdtted on

0:::-

l-\SSAULT,

Idal:o Code 18-901, 905, 906,

about tl:e 25th day of April,

2006,

and

that on June 19, 2006, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to
such charge which plea was accepted by the Court.
Based upon the Presentence
any,

in

of
,

the
and

the

,

in

and any statertu:mt-s

the

the Court finds that the interests of
of

be served if the

were

to the Idaho State Board of

on
Good cause

BE WITHHELD and
State

COMMENCING

the de
of

AUGUST

31,

on PROBATION to

be

FOR A PERIOn OF FIVE

2000,

upon

the

::ollowing

(5)

YEARS

terms

and

conditions:
(1)

Laws and Cooperation:

The defendant shall respect

and

obey all city, county, state and federal laws and have no
law violations (other than a traffic infraction as defined
by the state of Idaho), and shall comply with all lawful
requests of his supervising probation officer including,
but

not

limited

to,

participation

in

the

intensive

ORDER WITHHOLDING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
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supe~vision

(2)

The

Residence:

without

caseload.

first

defendant

obtaining

shall not
permission

change residence
defendant's

f~om

supervising probation officer.
(3)

The defendant shall submit a written, truthful

Reports:

report to defendant's supervising probation officer each
and every month and shall report in person on dates and
at times specified by such probation officer.
(4 )

The

TraveL:

defendant

shall

not

leave

Idaho

or

defendant's assigned probation district of Lewis, Idaho,
Clearwater, Nez ?erce, and Latah counties without first
ssion of defendant's supervising

obtaining written
probation officer.
(5)

The

EmpLoyment:

defendant

shall

seek

and

maintain

gainful employment and, once such employment is secured,
shall

n,ot

terminated

change
'iIi thout

that

employment

first

or 'cause

it

to

be

obtaining l.,;rri t Len pernission

from defendant's suporvising probation officer; or,

in

the alternative, if defendant chooses to pursue education
in

a

program

probation

approved

officer,

by

defendant

defendant's
shall

enroll

supervising
in

such

a

ORDER WITHHOLDING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
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program and not chQnge his course
without

prior

written

study or drop out

o~

Dermission

of

such

probation

officer.
(6)

Alcohol:

The

defendQnt

shall

not

conSL:r:le

or

possess

alcoholic beverages in any form and will not enter upon
any

establishment

consL:mption
income;

on

the

where

premises

defendant

the

the

sQle
is

a

shall

of

alcohol

primary

submit

to

for

SOL:rce

of

tests

of

defendant's bodily fluids for traces of alcohol at the
defendant's own expense whenever requested by defendant's
supervising

proba~ion

officer

or

any

agent

of

the

Division of Probation and Parole of the Idaho State Board
of Correction.

The

defendan~

shall submit to any Lesting

deened necessary by the defendant's probation officer to
deLermine if the de=endant has an alcohol abuse problem.
The

de~endanL

alcohol

abuse

shall

al~o

deemed

submit to any counseling for

warranted

by

the

defendant's

probation officer.
(7 )

Controlled Substances:

possess

any

The defendant shall not use or

contro'led

substance

unless

la,;vfully

prescribed for defendanL's use by a licensed physician or
ORDER WITHHOLDING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
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the

dentist;

defendant's
substar.ces

defendant

bodily
at

the

fluids

shal_

subKit

for

traces

defendant's

own

to
of

tests

of

controlled

expense

whenever

requested by defendant's supervising probation office- or
a~y

agent of the Division of Probation and Parole of the

Idaho State Board of Correction.

The

de~e~dant

shall

submit to any testing deemed necessary by the defendant's
probation officer to determine if the defendant has a
substar.ce abuse p:::-oblem.

The defendant sha 1 also submit

to any counseling for substance abuse deemed warranted by
the de;endant's p:::-obation officer.
( 8)

Weapons:

The defendant shall not purchase,

carry,

or

have in his possession any firearms or weapons.
(9 )

Search:

The

defendant

shall

submit

to

a

search

of

defendant's persor., vehicle, residence, and/or property
conducted in a reasonable manner and at :::-easonable times
by ar.y agent of the Division of Probation and Parole of
the Idaho State Board of Correction in order to determine
whethe:-:: or not the defendanL is complying wi L:1 Lhe terms
and conditions of his probation.

ORDER WITHHOLDING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
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(10) Payments:
(a)

The defendant shall:

Pay restitution in an amount to be determined at a
restituLion hearing scheduled for November 2, 2006,
at 4:00 p.m.i

(b)

Pay a fi:1e of $1,000.00;

(c)

Pay court costs of $97.50;
Total

$1097.50

The total of such s,-:n,s shall be paid to the clerk of this
Court in such reasonable installments as may be agreed to
by the defendant and Lhe defendant's probation officer.
To the

extent

tf:at

the defendant

and the defendant IS

probation officer are unable to reach an agreement, the
cO:lrt 'dill deLermine a reasonable amount of payments.

In

any event, all such sums shall be paid in full prior to
Lhe defendant's release from probation.
shall be made by cash,
money order,
The defendant

All payme:1ts

castier's or certified check or

and no personal checks will be accepted.
shall

also be

required to pay a

$2.00

processing fee with each installment.

(11) Costs

of

Probation

Supervision:

The

defendant

i,ill

co:mply with Idaho Code 20-225 by paying a fee of not :more
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than

$50.00

Correction

per

month

he~p

to

to

the

defruy

the

Idaho

Department

costs

of

of

defendant's

probation supervision at such times and in such aFounts
as his probaLion officer may direct.
(12) Association:
person (s)

defendant

Tie

with

shall

\<ihom defendant's

assoc~ate

not

with

supervising probation

officer directs him noL Lo associate.
(13)

Probution

Duration:

length

has

been ordered

of

time;

hO'l'iever,

terminated

until

the

for

probation

Court

has

both

a

shall

specific
not

be

reviewed

the

performance of the probationer and has signed an order
discharging the probationer.
extension

for

non-pay,nent

Probation is subject
of

costs,

fines,

to
and

restitution or for unsatisfactory performance.
Special Conditions of Probation:

(14)

The defendant shall serve thirty

(30)

days in the Latah County jail with credit for ten

(10)

Incarceration:

days served.

The defendant shall report to the Latah

County Jail by 6:00 p.m. on August 31, 2006.
(15) Mental Health Counseling:
and

complete

such

mental

The defendant shall at Lend
health

counseling

as

his
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probation officer may designate.
( 1_

6) No Con tact Order:

The defendant shall have no contact

with the victims herein outside legal proceedings.
(17)

Community

hundred
si tes

Service:

(100)

as

may

0::

defendant

shall

perform

one

hours of co:nmuni",=y service at such \"ork
be

probation officer.
a fee

The

approved

by

defendant

1

S

s:lpervising

Additionally, the defendant shall pay

$.60 per hour of cOfl"h"'":1Unity service v;ork pursuant

to Idaho Code 31-3201C, which shall be paid to the Latah
CO:lnty Treasurer who shall transmit

~he

same to the State

Insurance Fund.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that a restitJtion hearing shall be
scheduled for November 2, 2006, at 4:00 p.m. or as soon thereafter
as can be heard.

Sho:lld restitution be stipulated to prior to the

restitution hearing, said hearing shall be vacated.

FURTHER, in accordance 'iii th the Idaho DNA and Genetic l'1arker
Database nct of 1996,

I.C.

19-5501 et.

seq:, the defendant shall

submit a DNA sample and thumbprint.
O}I,?ED this
August 31, 2006.

~ ~ day

of September,

2006,

nunc pro tunc to

QM~~
~ Stegner
District Jcdge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
7

do hereby

certify that

ful2..,

tc::ue,

complote and correct

copies of the foregoing ORDER 1fHTHHOLDING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AND
ORDER OF PROBATION 1tJor:o delivered to the fo2..lovJing 2S indicated:
~~ynn

Ma i :
[ 1 Overnight Mail
[ ] Fax
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ,/]/U . S.

~losman

Attorney at La"J
P.O. Box 8456
Moscow, 1D 83843
Wil2..iam W. T~ompson, Jr.
Latah County Prosecuting
Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, 1D 83843

Attor~ey

[
U.S. MaE
[ J Overnight Mail
[ ]~/ Fax
[c.1 Hand Delivery

Latah County Sher:iff's Office
Lt. Jim Loyd, Jail
Attn:
Latah County Courthouse
MOSCO'll, 1D 83843

U. S. :VIail
Over:night Ma 1
[ ] Fax
[ .-r/ 'Hand Delivery

Lata~ County S~eriff's Office
Attn:
Kar:en Johnso~, Records
Latah County Couc::t~ouse
MOSCOW, 1D 83843

[

Probation a~d Parole
Department of Correction
P.O. Box 1408
Lewisto~, ID 83501

on this

day of .

j
]

o. S. ~vlaE
[
Overnight Mail
[ ] Fax
[;~r/Hand Delivery
O.S.

MaLe

Over~ight

~lail

[ ] Fax
[-.."'t'Ha~d Deliver:y

, 2006.
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1

respect to the motion to enforce the Rule 11 Agreement, I'm

2

denying that motion.

3

and if you want to me to certify it for purposes of appeal,

4

I'll be happy to do that, Mr. Bond.

c

Rule 11 Agreement, as crafted, can be enforced in the way

E

that you seek to have it enforced at this juncture.

And I'm denying that with prejudice,

I don't think that the

There's a lot of water under the bridge here, and

7
8

I think to get back to my earlier observation, this is a

S

dynamic process.

And in order for me to restore Mr. Guess's

Ie

rights I have to find that it is compatible with the public

11

interest, and I have to do that now as opposed to when I

12

entered the withheld judgment.

1=

That isn't to say that I will never grant the

14

relief requested by Mr. Guess, it's that at this juncture I'm

1~

unprepared to do so.

16

reconsider, I'm denying that, as well, but I'm denying that

17

without prejudice.

so, to the extent that it's a motion to

think there will come a time when Mr. Guess1s

18

I

1~

rights will be restored.

2C

will be, but

21

given the contrition that I have seen, given the

22

rehabilitation that I have seen, I think Mr. Guess is on the

2~

right track as far as having me grant the relief that he

24

requests.

2:

I

I can't tell you when that time

thin.k given the showing that I have seen,

DO I

think that I'm bound to do it by the Rule 11

SHERYL ENGLER, RPR, CSR - LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
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1

Agreement?

I don't think so.

2

I were bound, I would do so.

And if I were -- if I thought
But I don't think I am bound.

I think that's a dynamic process, and I have to make a
4

determination independent of the granting of the withheld
judgment to grant the relief that's requested by Mr. Guess at

E

this juncture.
I can tell you I haven't ever seen the showing

7
8

that was made by Mr. Nevin at the last hearing as it relates

<;

to someone's rehabilitation.

Mr. Guess is clearly contrite.

lC

He's remorseful.

11

be awarded the rel ief that he seeks today.

lL

there's a twofold determination.

1_

that he has done everything that he can do, but that it would

14

be compatible with public interest.

1:

He has done all that he can do in order to
But I thi nk

Not only must I determine

I'm not saying that Michele Guess's acquiescence

IE

in this request is what needs to occur.

I can tell you that

17

if she had no objection, I would grant it, though.

18

some point I may conclude that that acquiescence will never

IS

be forthcoming and that it is yet compatible with the public

2C

interest to grant Mr. Guess the relief he requests.

But at

That may come as a big disappointment to

21

22

Mr. Guess.

2

that I will at some point grant him the relief he requests.

24
2C

It may come as some recognition that he has hope
This is a tough case.

doubt about it.

I don't think there's any

But I don't think the Rule 11 Agreement

SHERYL ENGLER, RPR, CSR
LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
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otherwi se cl ear.
MR. BOND:
THE COURT:
4

okay.

okay.

And I'm -- I may be conflating the

civil rules with the criminal rules in telling you that.
MR. BOND:

E

time.

7

reconsideration.

8

with.

That's -- that's my problem half the

I keep going back to the civil rule on
I was thinking, is there reconsideration

THE COURT:

well, and as I say, I'm -- this is a

1C

dynami c process.

And I thi nf< if Mr. Guess stays on the

11

trajectory that he's on that at some point. even if Michele

12

Guess continues to object, I would find the relief. he

13

requests meritorious.

14

MR. BOND:

So -- so, just to cl ari fy, Your Honor,

I"

so I -- I -- so that I know I understood you right, did. you

IE

say earlier that if Michele didn't object, then you would

17

grant the relief?
THE COURT:

18

MR. BOND:
THE COURT:

2C
21

okay.

okay.

whether that's possible is anybody's

guess.

22

MR. BOND:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. BOND:

2:::

I did.

okay.
No pun intended.
So, that's what you're really hinging

the -- the compatible with public interest: is, whether if
SHERYL ENGLER, RPR, CSR - LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
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1

Michele is -- your concern over Michele?
THE COURT:

2

MR. BOND:

That's my current reservation.
okay.

okay.

And -- and just so that

4

Charles knows, is there -- is there anything else that he

2

needs to be doing to somehow help the process along or just

E

continue to be a law abiding citizen?
THE COURT:

7

Continue to be a law abiding citizen.

8

continue to do the things that he's done in the time that

~

he's been on probation.

AS I said. I don't think I've ever

1C

seen a showing as positive as I saw for Mr. Guess.

11

hesitancy is based on the compatibility with the public

12

interest, and Michele Guess as a victim of this offense,

13

carries no small amount of voice in that.
MR. BOND:

14

And my

And -- and then, Your Honor, lastly,

I"

is there -- I mean, just so -- I mean, Charles hasn't made

IE

any decisions.

17

that -- you know, I -- I don't want -- we don't want to be

18

bothering the court, you know, as we could well know for

IS

bringing motions back, or.

2C

But, I mean, how -- what's a reasonable time

THE COURT:

well, they tell me I'm not supposed

21

to give advisory opinions, and I have bridled at that ever

22

since I've been at the bench because I don't think it does me

2~

any good to hold my cards close to my chest, but I can't tell

24

you

22

MR. BOND:

okay.

SHERYL ENGLER, RPR, CSR - LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
(509)386-6970 - email:
sherylengler@gmail.com
42

Appendix - C - Page - 42

So, that's my argument.
2

out.

And I appreciate your hearing me

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Nevin.

Mr. Thompson,

4

I believe that a victim is entitled to make a statement.

~

there -- does MS. Guess wish to make a statement?

E

MS. GUESS:

7

MR. THOMPSON:

Is

Yes, I do.
well

J

Your Honor t Ms. Guess and I

t

have spoken, and she can speak for herself as far as what --

s

what her feelings are about this.

1C

THE COURT:

Ms. Guess.

11

MS. GUESS:

Thank you -- thank you -- thank you,

12

Judge.

YOU know, I believe in resolution.

I:

believe that I have my rights, too, as a victim.

14

is the law.

E

honored.

And the law

And I believe that your decision will be

I do wish to continue my relationship with my

IE
17

son.

18

some fear.

Ie

will my immediate family.

2C

But I also

And I would also like to tell you that I still have
I will never probably resolve that and neither

so, it's your decision, Judge.

And I have

21

written a letter to you in the very beginning telling you my

22

feelings about my position.

2:::

as a victim, will always be in fear of Mr. Guess.

24

your decision, Judge.

2~

THE COURT:

And to this point, you know, I,
So, it's

And thank you for letting me speak.
You're welcome.

And thank you.

SHERYL ENGLER, RPR, CSR - LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
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1

Mr. Thompson, would you like to be heard?
MR. THOMPSON:

2

Your Honor, I just, for the

record, since I believe my responses to the motion have
4

mostly been from correspondence, the State is not aware of

~

any legal basis as far as a probation violation or any

E

noncompliance with probation on the part of Dr. Guess that

7

would forbid him seeking this relief.

8

matter of court's discretion.

S

about if the court believes that the relief is consistent

10

we believe it's a

I think the statute talks

with the interests of justice.
I certainly know that historically the court has

11
12

granted this kind of relief in virtually every case that

1

comes before it where there's been no noncompliance -- I'm

14

sorry for the double negative -- with probation, but the

1~

State leaves it to Your Honor's discretion.

IE

THE COURT:

Anything else, Mr. Nevin?

17

MR. NEVIN:

NO, Your Honor.

Thank you.

(PAUSE IN THE PROCEEDINGS)

18

IS

THE COURT:

well, I would say that this is a hard

20

case.

21

we 11 as any defendant I can remember whi le on probati on.

22

have thoughtful and numerous letters from people who

2

apparently know the defendant and can vouch for him and his

24

performance while on probation.

2"

On one side, X have a defendant who has performed as
I

On the other side of the scale. I have what is
SHERYL ENGLER, RPR, CSR - LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
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abominable behavior which resulted in a plea of guilty being
2

tendered by the defendant and a victim who is the mother of
the

d~fendant's

the defendant.

son, and who apparently still is in fear of
That doesn't make for an easy decision.
(PAUSE IN THE PROCEEDINGS)

THE COURT:

I'm going to deny the motion and do

7

deny the motion.

I'm doing so without prejudice, which

8

means, Ms. Guess, that if Mr. Guess wishes to rebring the
motion in the future, he would be able to do so.
I think Mr. Thompson is correct that in virtually

1
11

all of these cases in the past where I've been shown what I

12

have been shown in this case,I have granted the motion.

1

don't remember a case in the past in which a victim testified

14

against the motion, frankly.

1

e

So, the motion is denied

without prejudice.
Mr. Thompson, would you submit an order to that

1

17

effect, please?

18

MR. THOMPSON:

1

THE COURT:

IS there anything else we need to

21

MR. NEVIN:

NO, Your Honor.

22

MR. THOMPSON:

2

THE COURT:

2

24

I

Yes, sir.

take up?

I don't know of anything, Judge.

We are in recess.

(COURT RECESSED AT 9:52 A.M.)
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPTION

2v_____________________________________________________________
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~

THE DEFENDANT:
2

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

In talking to you today, it strikes

~

me that English is your primary language.

4

primary language?

c:

THE DEFENDANT:

E

THE COURT:

7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

THE COURT:

C

Yes.

Have you studied other languages?
No.

Latin.

How many years of Latin did you

study?
THE DEFENDANT:

1C

11

One year in college in 19 -- in

1961.

THE COURT:

12

Are you able to read and understand

1~

the documents contained in this file?

14

THE DEFENDANT:

I.':

THE COURT:

IE

Are you able to understand what I am

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

22

2.':

I've been charged with aggravated

assault.
THE COURT:

And my understanding is that you're

pleading pursuant to a Rule 11 Agreement; is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT:

24

Yes, sir.

what have you been charged with?

THE DEFENDANT:

21

Yes.

saying to you today?

17

2C

Is English your

THE COURT:

Yes.

why don't you explain to me what your

understanding is of what will happen to you if I accept that
SHERYL ENGLER, RPR, CSR - LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
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1

plea.
THE DEFENDANT:

2

well, my understanding is that

there will be a presentencing investigation and then a
4

sentencing hearing.
THE COURT:

And do you understand that the

E

agreement contemplates that you would receive a withheld

7

judgment as a result of pleading guilty to this charge?
THE DEPENDANT:

8

THE COURT:
1C

DO you know what a "wi thhe 1d

judgment" means?

11

THE DEPENDANT:

12

THE COURT:

13

Yes, si. r.

Yes.

Why don

f

t

you exp1ai n to me what

you're understanding is.
THE DEFENDANT:

14

well, I mean that -- I guess, I'd

1"

explain that-- my understanding of the entire agreement is

IE

that I -- that I am pleading guilty to this charge and that I

17

will spend -- my punishment will include 30 days in

18

incarceration in the Latah county jail.

E

fi ne.

2C

felony charges.

21

I fulfill the period of probation without any problems in

22

that period of time,that the felony charges would ",,- would

And I

1

In P1eadi ng

I will pay a $1,000

gu; 1ty to one of the -- one of the

I'll have a year period of probation, and if

be dropped.
24

MR. MOSMAN:

2"

THE COURT:

Judge, if I might?
Yes.

SHERYL ENGLER, RPR, CSR - LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
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MR. MOSMAN:

1

2

I may have misunderstood my client.

Or I thought -- I understood him to say that he -- he thought
that he would have a year period of probation.

And I -- I

4

now understand him to have said that he understands that he

o

will have a period of probation and he knows that will be

E

determined by the Court.

7

THE DEFENDANT:

8

THE COURT:

s

okay.

well, Mr. Guess, the -- I think you

understand what a withheld judgment means.

It means that if

lC

you comply with your terms and conditions of probation that

11

at the conclusion of the period of probation, which is for a

12

period of no more than five years, according to the

13

agreement, that you could come in and petition to have your

14

guilty plea, which you tendered today, withdrawn and the

1~

charge against you dismissed.

IE

THE DEFENDANT:

17

THE COURT:
prepared.

1~

than August 14.

2C

for August 21st at 4:00 p.m.

22

you understand that?

I do, yes.

I'm going to order a presentence be

18

21

00

I'm going to order that it be prepared no later
I will schedule sentencing in this matter

Mr. Mosman, if you have witnesses whom you wish
to present in response to or in rebuttal of the presentence,
you'll need to notify the State of that no later than the

24

17th of August.

I'm sure that's -- is the 21st of August

2~

available to both counsel?
SHERYL ENGLER, RPR, CSR - LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
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THE COURT:

I make the following findings and I

2

draw the following conclusions, I find that Mr. Guess is

-

intelligent and articulate.

4

understands the nature of the offense with which he has been

~

charged.

E

consequences of pleading guilty to the charge against him in

7

the amended criminal information.

8

factual basis for the guilty plea tendered by Mr. Guess.

S

also conclude that the guilty plea is freely and voluntarily

I clearly find that he

I also find that Mr. Guess understands the

And I find that there is a

Ie

given.

11

entered in the record.

12

11 plea Agreement until after I've had an opportunity to

13

review the presentence report.

14

need to take up?

Ie

I

I accept that guilty plea and order that it be

MR. CRAIG:

I am reserving acceptance of the Rule

Is there anything else we

YeS, Your Honor.

The State would ask

IE

that you renew the NO Contact order.

17

has previously ordered Mr. Guess to stay farther than 100

18

feet away from the victims.

IS

footage be increased.

2C

feet.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. MOSMAN:

The No Contact order

Mrs. Guess has asked that that

I'd ask that you increase it to 300
Any objection to that?
NO, Your Honor.

I assume that

counsel and the Court may be aware that, as I indicated
24

earlier, there is a divorce action, and I assume that there

2~

are going to be appearing in court together.
SHERYL ENGLER, RPR, CSR - LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
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or evidence by way of aggravation that you would like to
2

present?

4

MR. CRAIG:

NO, Your Honor, thank you.

THE COURT:

Then, Mr. Mosman, this is your

~

opportunity to make argument with respect to sentencing.

E

-- I am prepared to accept the Rule 11 Agreement and will be

7

bound by it.
MR. MOSMAN:

8
~

Thank you, Your Honor.

I

with that

being said, as I understand it, and the Court has indicated

1C

that you'll follow the Rule 11 plea Agreement, and with Mr.

1

--

or Or. Guess will be sentenced in accordance with that --

12

THE COURT:

1:3

MR. MOSMAN:

Yes.
-- I know that Dr. Guess has

14

prepared a statement for the Court today, and I think he

E

would like to speak to the Court.

1E

Court would like to hear from him.

17

And I don't know when the

I do know that Dr. Guess has also asked me to

18

express his appreciation to Mr. craig and his office and

1C

their willingness to grant us some additional time to prepare

2C

for today's hearings, mostly Your Honor for doing so.

21

also asked me to express his appreciation to the Sheriff's

22

Office, who by his own description, acted as total

2_

professionals throughout this case, and he very much

24

appreciates what they have done.

2~

He's

Your Honor, I think with that then, given the
SHERYL ENGLER, RPR, CSR - LATAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
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1

minutes after they got upstairs is when they made that phone

2

call.

3

said the phone call was with Michele's cell phone.

4

shows it at 6:04 p.m.

And the phone call on the cell phone records -- and he

c

And that

So, judging by her cell phone records, the time

E

period of that Michele Guess gave appears to be more accurate

7

than the time period that Mr. Guess gave.
That being said, I do think that the Rule 11 plea
Agreement is appropriate, and

I

ask that you follow that plea

Ie

agreement.

11

the fear that

12

that you impose the full five years' probation to protect and

1

give MS. Guess a feeling of safety, at least in that five

14

years' term of probation.

1~

However, given the seriousness of the crime, and
MS.

Guess fears -- or has for Mr. Guess,

ask

I

Also ask that you impose asa specific term of

IE

probation, again, to help alleviate some of Ms. Guess's fears

l'

that Mr. Guess not be allowed to possess any firearms.

18

recognize that if he was to possess a firearm, it would be a

IS

separate crime, but I think it's important that be a specific

2C

condition of probation, as well.

21

I do

For restitution, I'm going to ask that you leave

22

that open at this time.

crime victims compensation has paid

2

some money, but they are still looking -- still

24

investigating.

2~

they're investigating.

They have several more bills coming in that
so, I ask that you leave restitution
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s

not

1

MR. MOSMAN:
o

•

11

12
l

Ci

ea

s case.

I

am
r

tions, which would i

not consume any

ic

in any

r

rates a majo

ty of its income

he
ness

rough the sale

rages.
There are components of this file that lead me to

1

worry

18

substance abuse, and so

I

think alcohol,

a substance, but in my experience, it tends to be
with some regula

1

would fall within that

prohibition.

21
22

am

I

my standard terms

1<=

2

e

Mr.

14

17

NO, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Ie

p

I

am i
i

am orde

ng a fine in the amount

days incarce
court costs in
in

24

on here locally.
amount

$1,000.
I

I

am

$97.50.

terms

ons,
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extent

7

Mr. Guess

nk it's important

I

8
I

am not imposing a

vely

11

can.

I
I

am orde

1-:>

p

14

Michele Guess or

tion of

term

as a

contact wi

Mr. Guess not

on

sease.
more

1 courts will

I

1

L

of your term and condition of p

17

you to do that, that would be a very

18

just in this case, but in other cases.

r
ngs,

p

c viol

a

so that contacting Mrs. Guess

on, Mr. Guess.

on
were

g problem for you, not

I believe that submitting to DNA testing is

1
2

in

1 j

red by statute, so

11i

I was

21

reasons

22

Mr Guess,

I

am imposing
to

I see someone

2::

I
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It's rare
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24
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numerous
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1
2

I

rson

to tu

4

\/Je can't tu

not even

was
7

8

is

to

were

f.

't in any way
11

Apri 1.

It's i

d that,

I

1

I

to

ng to impose 100 hours of community

am

They say wo

, Mr. Guess.

for the

is

think if you were back working again, it would be the
r you can accompli

1

best thing for you.

2

another question, but that ce

nly

d

that is
my assessment.

on.

I

1n my experience that if you toe the 1i ne

2

that is

2

some
p

medical

as a whole.

on

service.

to

e
r

onto

benefi

ons
p

you may be

I

you

this i

to

e in

e what

many respects.
13

you did in

on
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE.
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)
)

V.'

)
)
)

)

CHARLES EARL GUESS,
Defendant.

Case No. CR-2006-01646
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS
WITHHELD JUDGMENT

The Defendant's "Motion to Dismiss Withheld Judgment" having come on for
hearing before the Court by conference call on November 16, 2011; the Defendant
appearing by telephone with his attorneys, David Nevin and Annie McDevitt; the State
appearing telephonically through the Latah County Prosecuting Attorney; and the victim,
Michelle Guess, appearing telephonically; the Court having heard the arguments pf the
parties, the statement of the victim and having reviewed the file including the Defendant's
submission of letters in support of his motion, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises, good cause appearing;

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS WITHHELD
JUDGMENT: Page -1-
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It is HEREBY ORDERED that the

to Dismiss

IS DENIED without

BE

the reasons

by the Court on the

DATED this ----'-__

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS WITHHELD
-2-

-

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS WITHHELD JUDGMENT were served on the following in the
manner indicated below:
Annie McDevitt
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett
P.O. Box 2772
.
Boise, ID 83701

'"[-,lV.S.
f\

William W. Thompson, Jr.
Prosecuting Attorney
Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843

[] U.S. Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ hFax
~J,\!Hand Delivery

""1

Dated this eX

Mail
~] Overnight Mail
[] Fax
[ ] Hand Delivery

lX£Q~e-(l

day of-Ne¥ember, 2011.

SUSAN PETERSEN
Latah County Clerk of the Court

Q~~~~
Deputy Clerk

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS WITHHELD
JUDGMENT: Page -3-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

CHARLES EARL GUESS,
Defendant.

COUNTY

LATAH

Case No. CR-2006-1646

ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
ENFORCE RULE 11 PLEA
AGREEMENT AND ORDER
DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE
GUILTY PLEA, TERMINATE
PROBATION, DISMISS ACTION
AND RESTORE CIVIL RIGHTS

The Defendant, ChaTles Earl Guess ("Guess"), brought a Motion to Enforce
Rule 11 Plea Agreement and to Set Aside Guilty Plea, Terminate Probation, Dismiss
Action and Restore Civil Rights. A hearing on Guess's motion was held on JanuaTY
26, 2012. The following individuals appeared before this Court: the State's attorney,
William W. Thompson, Jr.; Guess's attorney, Roderick C. Bond; and Guess. For the
reasons stated at the hearing and in this Order,. Guess's lllotionwill be denied.
ORDER DE:N'YING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO ENFORCE RULE 11
PLEA AGREEMENT AND ORDER
DE:NYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SF;rr ASIDE GUILTY PLEA, . . .

.
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In April 2006, Guess and his then-wife, Michele Guess ("Michele"), were going
through a bitter divorce. On April 25, 2006, Guess was being deposed by "Nllchele's
lawyer, Stanley Welsh ("Welsh") in Lewiston. The deposition adjourned so that
Guess, Michele, and vVelsh could travel to the Guess's home in rural Latah C01mty to
physically examine the contents of the couple's home. While there, Michele and Welsh
went to the home's vault. \Vhile their backs were turned to Guess, he produced a 040
caliber Glock pistol and moved the slide to indicate a bullet had been advanced into
the gun's barrel. When Michele and 'Welsh turned around to face Guess, he
threatened to kill both of them and then commit suicide. Guess then struck Michele
in the face, twice, with his left hand, while holding the gun in his right. While Guess
never carried out his threats to kill .:YIichele and her attorney, he was ultimately
charged with two counts of felony aggTavated assault and one count of misdemeanor
domestic battery.
Guess eventually entered into a Rule 11, I.C.R., Plea AgTeement with the State
on June 16,2006, in which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of Aggravated
Assault, a felony in violation ofl.C. § 18-905. See Rule 11 Plea Agreement at 1. The
State agreed to recommend that Guess receive a Withheld Judgment and be placed on
no more than five-years probation with the Idaho Department of Correction. See id. at
2. This CouTt accepted Guess's plea of guilty to the charge of Aggravated Assault at
his arraignment, held on June 19,2006. See Ct. 1\ilins. of ".firraignment" at 2.
ORDER DEl';'YING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO ENFORCE RULE 11
PLEA AGREEMENT AND ORDER
DENYIJ:\'G DEFENDAl.'JT'S MOTIO:\r
TO SET ASIDE GUILTY PLEA, ...
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1

At se:tlLEH1(:lng held on

31,

tlus Court

Plea Agreement and the proposed sentence set forth in

parties' Rule 1
agreement. See Ct. lvlins.

of "Sentencing"; Rule 11 Plea Agreenlent. In accordance with that agreement, tIns
Court entered a "Withheld Judgment and placed Guess on probation with the Idaho
Department of Correction for a period of five years. Order Withholding Entry of J.

and Order of Probation (Aug. 31,2006). Guess successfully cOlnpletedhis term of
probation as of September 1, 2011. See id at 2. Shortly after completing his
probation, Guess brought a Motion to Dismiss Withheld Judgment. After a hearing
on that motion, this Court entered an order denying the motion, without prejudice.

Order Denying Def. 's Nfot. to Dismiss Withheld J. (Dec. 23, 2011). At that time, this
Court made it clear that Guess was "discharged from probation." fd. at 2.
Guess now seeks to have his guilty plea set aside, his withheld judgment
dismissed, and civil rights restored through one of two avenues: (1) thi'ough
enforcement of the terms of the parties' Rule 11 Plea AgTeelnent, or (2) puisuant to
I.C. § 19-2604(1).

ANALYSIS
1. The unambiguous language of the Rule 11 Plea Ag1:eelllent does not

authorize the relief Guess seeks.
Plea agreements are examined by courts in accordance with the standards of
contract law. State v. Gomez---P.3d---,2011 WL 10855989 *3 (citation omitted). The
burden of proving the existence of an agreement, and a breach thereof, is on the
moving pal'ty. State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595, 226 P.3d 535, 537 (2010). In
ORDER DENYIKG DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO ENFORCE RULE 11
PLEA AGREEMENT AND ORDER
DENY1NG DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SET ASIDE GUILTY PLEA, .. .
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aeiLerml:tllIlg whether there has been a breach, courts must examine the language of
the particular agreement. Gomez, ---P.3d---,2011

10855989 *3.

an agreement

is unambiguous, its meaning and legal effect "must be determined from. the plain
meaning of the [agreemfmt's] own words." Win of 1Vlichigan, Inc. u. Yreha United,
Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 751, 53, P.3d 330,334 (2002).
On the other hand, if an agreement is "reasonably subject to conflicting
int81'pretation, then it is ambiguous." DeLancey u. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63,65,714
P.3d 32, 34 (1986) (citation omitted). Any ambiguities shall be resolved in favor of
the defendant. Gomez, ---P.3d---,2011 WL 10855989 *3. (citation omitted). Thus,
the State must bear the burden for any lack of clarity in the agreement. Peterson,
148 Idaho at 596, 226 P.3d at 538. In construing that ambiguity in favor of the
defendant, courts should look to the defendant's "reasonable understanding" of the
terms of the agreement. ld. This approach also "reflects the proper constitutional
focus on what induced the defendant to plead guilty." leI. quoting U.S. v. De la

Fuente, 8 F. 3d 1333, 1337,11. 7 (9th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original).
When district courts give "unqualified approval to a plea agreement they, like
the parties, become bound by the terms of that agreement." U.S. u. Ritsenw, 89 F.
3d 392, 401 (7th Cir. 1996); see also State u. Horldey, 125 Idaho 860, 865, 876 P.2d
142, 147 (App. Ct. 1994).
In this case, the language of the parties' Rule 11 Plea Agreement is
unambiguous. The agreement states in relevant part, "the Defendant shall receive
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A defendant may apply to the court to have his

it

judgment
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under I.e. § 19-2604(1), which states in relevant part,
[u]pon
of the defendant and upon
showing that: the
court did not find, and the defendant did not
m any probation
violation proceeding that
defendant violated any of
terms or
of probation; ... the court may, if convinced by
showing that
is no longer cause
continuing the period
and if it be
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Rule 11 Plea
IS

§ 19-2604(1) is
2012.
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I do
certi..fY
true, complete, and correct copies of
order were delivered by the following methods to the following:
William W. Thompson, Jr.
Latah County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 8068
Moscow, ID 83843

foregoing

U.S. Mail
Overnight Mail
] Fax
Lb.,..:7l
Hand Delivery
,.
[
[

~

,[, "l. U.S. Mail
I( J Overnight Mail

Roderick C. Bonel
Attorney at Law
800 Bellevue Way N.E., Ste. 400
Bellevue, WA 98004

[
[

] Fax
] Hand Delivery

On this(Cl day of February 2012.

Q~ }Jl~~~2;-U"-_~)
Deputy Clerk
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